

It was decided at Quebec that Canadian air and naval forces would operate under overall British command and that Canada's army force would fight under United States ^{Command}. Even before the Quebec conference it was agreed that Canadian units would fight in the north or central Pacific as this area was of direct interest to Canada.

Prime Minister King announced this policy in his April 4 statement to the House of Commons:

"Prior to the Quebec conference of September, 1944, it was decided that, on the conclusion of the war in Europe, Canada's participation should be effected in the operational theatres of more direct interest to Canada, namely, the north or central Pacific."

As a result of this policy, the Canadian navy's first representative in the Pacific battle, H.M.C.S. UGANDA, has already been in action south of Okinawa; Canadian army forces will participate with United States forces in the advance on Japan; and Canadian air force units will have their chance to strike at the Japanese homeland as well as other Japanese-occupied territory.

Size of Canada's Pacific forces as well as extent and character of the domestic production program have been decided not by the Canadian government alone but by Canadian and other allied officials and committees. As Mr. King pointed out during his welcoming address to Major-General Hoffmeister on June 14:

"In the Pacific war, as in the war against Germany, every part of Canada's war effort at sea, on land and in the air, in munitions and supplies, and in every other way, has been planned and is being organized in closest co-operation with our principal allies, the United Kingdom and the United States."

Because the agreed size of Canadian forces to be used against Japan was so much smaller than what was needed to fight Germany, and thousands of men already in the services could not be used in the Pacific war, the chief problem facing Canada was not how to obtain the men but how to obtain the best and most efficient possible fighting force. All but 10% of the personnel who entered the three armed services volunteered for duty anywhere in the world for the duration of hostilities so are eligible for Japanese service.

Rather than detailing certain units for Pacific duty, it was decided that men should be allowed to volunteer - that is, to express a wish to stay in the war to the end. This was felt to be the most practical way of assuring the best possible Canadian units. As all men in action will have asked to serve against Japan, morale and determination will be of the highest. At the same time this policy has the result of allowing those men who have been in the war for a long time (many Canadians have been overseas four and five years) to return home unless they especially ask to serve against Japan.

Questionnaires were distributed to service personnel to ascertain those who wished to go to the Pacific. Those who do not volunteer for Pacific service will remain in the forces so long as their services are required for occupation, other necessary duties connected with completion of the war in Europe, or administrative work and training in Canada for the Pacific war. If not needed for these purposes they will be demobilized on a priority scheme, except for certain key personnel who may be earlier required for industry or other essential work.