

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, there has been heightened concern about the potential for proliferation of biological and toxin weapons. This paper does not directly address the issue of biological and toxin weapons per se.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) forbids the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons, as is shown from the enclosed box (see below). The Third Review Conference of the BTWC, held in September 1991, sought to address certain concerns through agreement on a refined and expanded set of confidence-building measures (CBMs) designed to provide greater transparency among States.

In September 1991, the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the BTWC also decided to establish an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts open to all States Parties to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. One category of measures agreed by the Group for evaluation is entitled "Information Monitoring" which includes "Surveillance of publications" as a separate measure.

Article I

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;

(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.