

made the notion of "backsliding" (i.e., renegeing on the agreement) increasingly less attractive and provided the parties with impetus to take greater risks for long-term peace as they were reassured that compliance with the Sinai II Agreement was not placing them in an unfavourable strategic position. That such confidence developed in an adversarial relationship where there was no history of conflict management is truly remarkable. This suggests that effective verification systems may be critical in contributing to confidence-building in similar adversarial relationships where the parties lack any degree of self-help and require incremental tests of the intentions of the other side.

- *Proposition 4*

Technology-intensive verification procedures can be integrated with more traditional kinds of peacekeeping operations in order to strengthen the compliance process.

The Sinai experience suggests that compliance is strengthened when all the "stakeholders" to the agreement are appropriately included in maintaining the new agreement and when verification responsibilities are of an interlocking nature; both the parties to the agreement and the third parties (UNEF, SFM) are responsible for the success of the enterprise. Equally important, the use of multimethod verification — the integration of ground sensor technology, aerial surveillance and satellite reconnaissance with traditional peacekeeping operations — created, through a synergistic process, a novel system of checks that significantly strengthened the monitoring of compliance.

In other regional settings, the extent to which multimethod verification is feasible will depend on the nature of the agreement and the kind of terrain, forces and manpower levels to be verified. The Sinai experience clearly illustrated the importance of designing a verification system to meet the specific needs of the *parties* within the context of a new agreement.

- *Proposition 5*

With appropriate modification, elements of the Sinai model can be applied to other regional conflict settings.

The cases analyzed here suggest that major elements of the Sinai model, appropriately modified to account for variations in mission, terrain and the number of parties, could indeed be transferred to other settings. The core elements of the model — a disengagement agreement composed of a demilitarized buffer zone flanked by zones of limited forces, all verified by a system of multiple interconnecting monitoring techniques — could do much to strengthen stability in conflict-prone areas.

Various components of the model might have to be expanded or contracted to produce a workable system depending on the case at hand. For example, the third party concept may have to be "elasticized" to incorporate different kinds of third parties (regional organizations, neutral and non-aligned nations) with several kinds of expertise. Perhaps a group of like-minded states, within a larger number of parties to an agreement, with a special technical expertise could manage a specific portion of the verification system. In addition, the extensive use of early warning stations and unattended ground sensors may have to be reconciled with the problems of intelligence gathering and the heightening of false alarm rates. Sensitivity to such problems at the outset of designing a verification system could do much to enhance its prospects for success. At a minimum, the very success of the Sinai model itself should lend impetus to serious initiatives in other regions.

