

terrence? There is no contradiction between the two. Canada is vigorously engaged in the pursuit of conditions that will help to realize the ultimate goal, but it will not be achieved overnight. The world would *not* become a safer place if, through the negotiation of inequitable nuclear reduction agreements, the balance of forces was upset. There must be a careful, step-by-step process, which takes account of the overall force postures of both sides and, in addition, deals with underlying East/West tensions. The 'suspicion' factor is critical; each side should have all possible assurances that the terms of any agreement will be honoured. Therefore, adequate verification measures are essential to arms control, even though the negotiation of verification measures can be very complex.

It is all too easy to get carried away by numbers when considering arms control, thereby losing sight of the objectives of increased security and enhanced stability. It is possible, for example, to have fewer overall weapons but a more unstable situation because of the nature of the residual forces; it is essential to factor into the arms control equation the destructive capability of systems and whether or not by their nature or their deployment, they are conducive to stability.

Hans Morgenthau has observed that men do not fight because they have arms but rather, they have arms because they deem it necessary to fight:

Take away their arms, and they will either fight with their bare fists or get themselves new arms with which to fight. The technology of warfare would change, but not the incidence of war. Yet it could be plausibly argued that the threat of all-out nuclear war has actually been the most important single factor which has pre-

vented the outbreak of general war in the atomic age. The removal of that threat through nuclear disarmament might increase the danger of war without assuring that the belligerents, using non-nuclear weapons at the start, would not resort to such weapons in the course of the war.<sup>8</sup>

This is the nuclear peace that, paradoxically, requires the two superpowers to strive to cooperate in order to maintain strategic stability through arms control; for the breakdown of that stability would threaten them both and, indeed, the entire world.

It is clear, that arms control cannot carry all the weight of East/West relations; hand-in-hand with arms control must go the building of trust through conflict resolution, and the breaking down of political, social and economic barriers. Jonathan Schell, in his book, *The Fate of the Earth*, saw the solution as nothing short of the reinvention of politics, indeed, the reinvention of the world. Neither politics nor the world are going to be reinvented — but there is plenty of room for improvement and Canadian foreign and defence policies are dedicated to this end.

Arms control is a fundamental part of Canadian security policy. So too are Canadian defence efforts, and our participation in collective security arrangements. Nuclear deterrence has played a vital part in assuring peace for Europe and North America for decades. We cannot stand aloof from deterrence, which relies on nuclear weapons, because we find it unpleasant. Of course it is unpleasant, but not so unpleasant as war itself, or the loss of peace with freedom. Canada has been prepared to bear a share of the risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, that go with collective security arrangements. If we, and NATO, were to falter, the risks for Canada, and for all nations, would be greater than the risks inherent in maintaining a stable deterrent.