

I stated on 23 January 1957 that the United States believes that:

strict observance by both Egypt and Israel of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and the fullest respect for the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly are the keys to the restoration of peace and stability. (A/PV. 645, page 2)

To be effective, the United Nations Emergency Force must serve as a restraint against any attempt to exercise belligerent rights or to engage in hostile actions contrary to the Armistice Agreement, the decisions of the Security Council and the resolutions of the General Assembly. The United Nations Emergency Force can best fulfill its mission and exercise such a restraining influence if, as proposed in the Secretary-General's report, it is deployed on both sides of the armistice line, particularly in the sensitive Gaza and El Auja sectors. This will enable the Force to co-operate most effectively in the supervisory duties of the Truce Supervision Organization, in those areas where the Organization is authorized to function under the Armistice Agreement and the relevant resolution of the Security Council.

Again, with regard to Gaza the United States supports the Secretary-General's recommendation. The Secretary-General should, through a mission of his selection, supervise the withdrawal of the present civil administration in the Gaza strip and take steps to ensure that incursions or raids across the armistice line in the Gaza area will not take place. The second draft resolution would provide for carrying out these measures.

As I also stated on 23 January, the United States believes that:

it is essential that units of the United Nations Emergency Force be stationed at the Straits of Tiran in order to achieve there the separation of Egyptian and Israeli land and sea forces. This separation is essential until it is clear that the non-exercise of any claimed belligerent rights has established in practice the peaceful conditions which must govern navigation in waters having such an international interest. All of this, of course, would be without prejudice to any ultimate determination which may be made of any legal questions concerning the Gulf of Aqaba. (A/PV. 645 pages 3-5)

The second draft resolution reflects this position taken by the United States, as expressed in my statement on 23 January.

The adoption of the second draft resolution now before the General Assembly would place the authority of the Assembly behind the rapid implementation of the measures proposed in the Secretary-General's report. The United States strongly supports the draft resolution, which, we think, deserves the largest possible support from the General Assembly.

The United States requests that the two draft resolutions should be considered together. We request that the second draft resolution should be put to the vote immediately after the first, and understand that that will be done. The adoption of either one of the draft resolutions without the other would jeopardize the achievement of the objective set forth in the resolution of 2 November and would not promote peace and stability in the region.

A variety of comments came from other delegations. Most of the Soviet bloc had no sympathy with what they regarded as improper concessions to an aggressor, and launched into general denunciations of United States policy in the Middle East. Some of the Arab representatives also held that the second resolution implied an abandonment of the principle of unconditional withdrawal. The Egyptian representative, however, re-stated briefly the Egyptian view, which, he said, was "perfectly in line with these resolutions". The representative of Israel criticized the second resolution as imprecise and incomplete.

The Canadian Delegation had been in favour of a single resolution, instead of two; and was concerned about the wording of the second. Mr. Pearson explained the Canadian attitude:

We have before us, as Members know, two draft resolutions: one on the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces and one on arrangements for peace and security in the area to follow such withdrawal.