reconciliation of these diverse judicial views, till the whole subject is authoritatively passed upon by the Court of Appeal, or by the Supreme Court. At least one clause in the Mechanic's Lien Act (that most absurd and hurtful of all illogical legislation) wears a most threatening aspect, portending the necessity of many a pitched battle on every word of it ere it be fully subdued to the uses of the much-enduring public. Then we can turn our regards upon the devastation which the Court of Appeal has wrought (and none too soon) upon the goodly growth of cases that developed the doctrine of pressure to its proudest height in *Davidson* v. *Ross*. That doctrine, as elaborated by a course of decisions beginning with Vice-Chancellor Mowat's judgment in *The Royal Canadian Bank* v. *Kerr*, 17 Gr. 47, was finally sublimated to this nicety, that if a debtor on the eve of insolvency crossed the street to one of his creditors, proposed to give him a security, and did give him a security, that transaction was invalid; but if the creditor crossed the street to the debtor, suggested that a security should be given and such security was given, that transaction was unimpeachable. It was high time that the daylight of common sense should be let in on these cases; and this has been done by the decision in appeal which has practically abolished the doctrine of pressure as a question of intent.

In conclusion: it is very desirable that an *equilibrium* as between law and equity should be observed and maintained in the *personnel* of the Appellate Courts. The preponderance of either will encourage and has already encouraged appeals. But with Courts of Appeal well-organized and well-balanced we see no reason to fear that their decisions will command and deserve respect; and that they will secure satisfaction of that practical sort, which shall obviate all necessity for carrying any of our appeals to England.

SECULAR v. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.

A curious question has arisen and been decided in the Supreme Court of Vermont. It appears that the complainants were members of the Catholic Church in the village of Brattleborough, and that on June 4th, 1875, the priest of the said church, acting in behalf of the complainants, sent to the respondents, who were the prudential committee of that school district, a request that the Catholic children might be excused from attendance at school on "all holy days," and especially on that day, being holy Corpu Christi day. To this note the committee replied that the request could not be granted, as it would involve closing some of the schools and greatly interrupting others.

It further appeared that about sixty Catholic children, by direction and command of their parents, were kept from school to attend religious services on said 4th of June, being, as stated in the bill, "holy Corpus Christi day." A few of them applied for admission to the schools in the afternoon of that day, and all, or nearly all, so applied the next morning. They were thereupon told by the committee that, as they had absented themselves without permission, and in violation of the rules of the schools, which they well understood, they could not return without an assurance from their parents, or their priest, that in future they would comply with the rules of the schools. The committee assured the children, and many of their parents, and also the priest, that if they would promise that the schools should not again be interrupted in like manner they would gladly re-admit said children; but the priest and parents refused to comply with such proposal, and claimed that on all days which they regard as holy they might, as matter of right, take their children from