

The Third World and the Cold War

different emphases for each. They are the allies of the United States, with the qualification that Japan is not in law permitted to be an ally in any formal sense. The alliances in question, of course, are East-West, at least in the strategic context. But there is no doubt that many of the stakes in the East-West contest are located in the South. It is, after all, the fact or possibility of Soviet advances in such countries as Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and South Yemen, which have been, along with the USSR arms build-ups, responsible for the freeze in East-West relations in the last several years. The fear of strategists is that a country which is really key to the vital interests of the West — such as Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Iran, or even a major Latin-American country — could eventually go the same way.

What North-South dialogue?

It is primarily American thinking which drives others in this direction. The United States is more apt to see developments in the Third World as being relevant to Western interests in the East-West contest than virtually anyone else does. Yet, the US, as an act of the head, has been less enthusiastic than other Western countries to accommodate on a global and institutional level the aspirations of the developing countries. While maintaining that the North-South dialogue is an important part of American diplomacy, the US has been extremely wary of multilateral North-South activities and has increasingly channelled US development assistance toward strategic objectives. The broad American view is that private enterprise is the best tool of development there is and that there is little if any reason to distinguish developing countries from the developed in international institutions, and in the international "system."

The US conclusion is that it is primarily on the political-military level that the security of the Third World relates to the interests of Western governments. This is virtually a distinguishing feature of the Alliance. The diverging views on the North-South/East-West connection are especially divisive because of the range of values and issues which the divergence reflects — no less than one's view of the world.

Cold War isn't everything

Both Europeans and the US share a common assumption that East and West are joined in some sort of a contest in the "South," and that it is in some vital area of the South that there is most likely to be a conflagration whose escalation and extension could lead to World War. That Western interests are vitally engaged in the South is not debatable, though they are seen in different terms by the various players. Despite a deepening relationship of future Western economic expansion to Southern markets which provided the rationale for much of the higher intensity in the North-South dialogue a few years ago, the basically strategic approach the US takes to the regions of the Third World often seems related primarily to its global strategic concerns. Europeans — and Canadians — more easily see forces in Third World countries in their indigenous contexts. They fear that conflict and escalation can erupt not because Third World countries are East-West surrogates but because instability is by definition volatile and dangerous.

We consider that the ingredients of chronic instability in the Third World are many:

- the clash between new and foreign technology and traditional values;
- instabilities created both by rapid economic development and by the lack of it;
- the relative absence of stable political institutions for the sharing and succession of power, and the pursuit of legitimacy by unstable regimes;
- sometimes unstable borders, a legacy of the colonial era;
- rising social expectations;
- the high level of armaments disseminated throughout the world;
- the increasing danger posed by nuclear proliferation;
- imponderables such as a wave of religious indignation and other trans-national phenomena;
- and, possibly above all, a loss of superpower control over events in the world.

Many in the West recognize that since interests common to the industrialized world are going to be affected by instability and almost random crises occurring in the Third World, we need the mechanisms and the policies to deal with them. The differences are over the extent to which we can develop mechanisms if we in fact do not agree on essentials: how much of the West's effort needs to be preventive and prescriptive, more economic than military, and to what extent should events in the Third World be colored by the East-West contest.

That contest represents the other basic level of insecurity in the world. It has usually been seen as being the great foreign policy preoccupation of our time. Its key, of course, is in US-USSR relations. The quality of US-USSR relations will be determined by respective behavior internationally in the context of what is agreed or understood to be permissible. Much of this behavior relates to responsibilities for, and responses to, events in the Third World. This imparts to the US a greater tendency to evaluate Third World events through an East-West prism. Many in US foreign policy circles acknowledge that Third World instability has indigenous roots, that it is generally not imported, though it may be abetted. But they are also deeply preoccupied by the East-West implications of Third World events. Thus, while they may agree in principle that these East-West implications become greater when the indigenous roots of the problems of the area are ignored, and the tensions left unresolved, strategic preoccupations often predominate and drive policy to the point of placing most of the emphasis on considerations of military security. It is an emphasis which is not shared by many others in the West. It is related to differences of assessment of East-West relations themselves.

Concerting the West

Recent discussions have made great progress in attracting Western countries to the notion that they should concert their efforts not to let economic relations with Eastern Europe contribute to the enhancement of the Soviet Union's military capability, directly or even indirectly. But there is reluctance among most countries in the Alliance to go so far as to align economic relations with the USSR along the basically adversarial lines which govern our strategic stance toward the East.

These differences reflect different views as to where to place the emphases in East-West relations in what we now