

ferred under that section against a man for that he "with a view to compel one E. T. to abstain from doing a certain act which the said E. T. had a legal right to do—to wit, the delivery of certain oil-cakes—unlawfully, wrongfully, and without legal authority, did hinder the said E. T. in the use of certain property—to wit, a horse and lorry used by the said E. T." It was argued on behalf of the defendant that no offence within the meaning of the section was disclosed, in that the words "other property" in sub-sec. 3 related only to words ejusdem generis with tools and clothes. The cases of *Reg. v. Payne* (L.R. 1 C.C. R. 27) and *Anderson v. Anderson* (72 L.T. Rep. 313 (1895), 1 Q.B. 749) were relied upon. The learned stipendiary held that a horse and lorry were "other property" within the meaning of the section, and that those words were not ejusdem generis with "tools and clothes," except that they could include only such property as was capable of being hidden, or of whose use a person might be deprived, or in whose use a person might be hindered. The case arose out of the late strike disputes in Hull, and would appear to be one which the 7th section of the Act was designed to meet—an object which would have been frustrated by the application of the ejusdem generis doctrine of construction.—*Law Times*.