

*Supply—National Defence*

We still want to get the answers and I suggest to the minister that it is far better for him to give them if he anticipates getting his estimates through. This is the sort of thing the minister wanted when he was sitting over here in the past. I did not question his motives when he wanted information then. Ultimately he got it. The hon. gentleman could be a little obstinate, a little difficult. That is why we are being a little difficult at the present time. We want this information. The minister is asking parliament to commit itself to a vast program of expenditure, a completely new program so far as the CF-5 is concerned and a completely new program so far as the destroyer escorts are concerned. As the hon. member for Greenwood said, we want an explanation. We do not want these glorious generalities.

Let the minister tell us what is in his mind with regard to all these matters. We are entitled to this information. The government's defence program must be assessed on the basis of the reasons, the rationale, advanced. He makes statements about the navy which none of us are prepared to accept merely on the strength of his say-so. Already he has obscured a number of factors. He has obscured the requirements of SACLANT. All these matters have been raised and the best course for the minister to follow is, I suggest, to take these questions seriously and give factual answers. Had he done so earlier we would have been through with this discussion a long time ago. I would have thought the minister had been around parliament long enough to know that the type of speech he made last night is not one calculated to get his estimates through with dispatch. He should know that, or is this part of the new boy-wonder conduct?

• (4:00 p.m.)

I am going to yield the floor to the minister to give him an opportunity to answer now about the mobile command. Let him give us the rationale for the CF-5 and not just simply say it is a cheap aircraft that might land on certain length runways. That may be the case but we have not seen it yet. There are some modifications to be made. It will not take to the air until next year. It will be quite some time before it comes into use.

We want to know the reason for the change to tactical air support for our ground forces. Why does this make our forces more mobile? It may add another arm to their effectiveness but we want to be able to judge that on the

[Mr. Lambert.]

basis of the information and the reasons advanced by the minister.

We also want to know a great deal more about our performance so far as SACLANT is concerned and also about the reorganization of the Maritime command. A great deal of credit is claimed for the fact that this is all going to be under one man. Let the minister explain the reasons that he feels this should be so and not just give a mere statement that such steps are going to solve all our problems. On that basis I now invite the minister to give us the answers and then we can get on with his estimates.

**Mr. Hellyer:** Well, Mr. Chairman—

**Mr. Muir (Cape Breton North and Victoria):** No nonsense, now. Get down to earth.

**Mr. Hellyer:** Always. On item No. 1 it is quite appropriate to discuss general matters of policy and philosophy so far as defence is concerned and I am quite prepared to do that. But when it comes to matters of detail I think we should pass on to item 15 when I can have the officials before me and answer any specific questions hon. members would like to ask. The philosophy behind the mobile force is very simple. It is out in the white paper—

**Mr. Lambert:** Oh, oh.

**Mr. Hellyer:** I really believe hon. gentlemen should reread it because there is a lot of good information in it that is just as valid today as when it was written. The philosophy is that in the world of today the likelihood of limited conflagrations, riots, insurrections, small wars and the overthrow of civil governments will continue as has been the case for the last 20 years. These things can occur in any part of the world and from time to time it might be in the real interests of this country to send a force of some kind or to participate in either a United Nations force, a Commonwealth force or together with any other group of nations with like interests. Therefore it is the capability to do this, to have forces which are air portable, with equipment not just to training scale but to a scale for fighting if required, which we are planning.

Probably of equal importance to the equipment that such forces must have is the strategic mobility to get them to their destinations, both sea and air mobility, air mobility to transport a force or what part of it is required in the shortest possible time and then sea mobility to bring such heavy equipment and support as may be required if the