

Supply—External Affairs

Nations organization to investigate the atrocities committed on both sides. Then they went on to say that Canada, as a member of the general assembly, should—

—urge that the United Nations, in its role as the leader in the struggle for world peace, take measures to initiate a peace settlement which effectively guarantees the right of self-determination for the peoples of Viet Nam.

I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, that it is easy to pass resolutions which say there should be a peace settlement which effectively guarantees the right of self-determination; that would clearly be the objective of all of us. I fully realize that in this regard passing resolutions and announcing desirable objectives is a relatively easy exercise. It is very much harder to find out how to achieve these desirable objectives which are stated in the resolution.

In view of the fact that Canada is a member of the international control commission, as the hon. member for Oxford reminded us, and because Canada has assumed this degree of responsibility, I ask the Secretary of State for External Affairs, if he participates in the debate later, whether he will say what Canada is doing to end this tragic war, which as far as I can see is getting worse all the time. France, which after all was a great imperial nation, found it impossible to maintain a position in Viet Nam. Is the United States going to achieve something there, or is the only answer really to work out, as part of the recognition of the People's Republic of China, an agreement to neutralize this particular area? I do not always agree with the views of Mr. de Gaulle.

Mr. Martin (Essex East): Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. gentleman a question? I am following his constructive speech with very great interest. Do I understand he is now suggesting that we work out an agreement with the Chinese people's republic for the neutralization of Indochina as a condition preceding the recognition of that regime, or its admission into the United Nations?

Mr. Brewin: I think that the neutralization of Indochina obviously concerns more countries than just two. I think the 18 nations now represented at Geneva would be parties to such an agreement; but I say a preliminary to the working out of some such neutralization arrangement may very well be the drawing of the Chinese people's republic into the United Nations, where there is a forum in which these matters could properly be discussed, with a view to developing a final arrangement. I would not suggest for a mo-

ment that we make that a condition of recognition, but I do say that it would possibly be an advantage, or be a by-product of extraordinary value if it could be brought about in that way.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs referred to what I might call a crisis in NATO, and I should like to say a few words in that regard. It is my personal view, and I think I speak if not for all, then for most of my party in saying this, that western unity in NATO still remains not only desirable, but a necessary basis for moving on to what I think is vitally important, and that is the extension of the detente in Europe. The massive confrontation of nuclear power in Europe, and particularly confrontation of tactical nuclear weapons in the front lines of Europe, constitutes a danger not only to Europe but to the whole world. I suggest, in other words, that the strategy of NATO has been basically unsatisfactory and should be changed.

I would ask the Secretary of State for External Affairs to expand on some remarks he made in an address to the Atlantic treaty association at Ottawa on September 15, 1964, and in which he said the following:

As far as the alliance itself is concerned, there is still a long way to go toward completion of the review of NATO defence policy which ministers required at the Ottawa meeting in May 1963. While I would not wish to overstress the problems of the alliance in that regard I cannot escape the feeling that the long term effects of not achieving some agreement in the fields of strategy, military integration, nuclear control, command structure and cost sharing are bound to detract from our effectiveness as an alliance in using the forces we have at our disposal. I believe that the time has come to face these problems and honestly to deal with them with the requisite boldness and imagination. In particular I believe that they point to the need for some re-thinking first with regard to a greater sharing in the military direction of the alliance, and second, in regard to the relationship between the civilian and military arms of the alliance.

I should like the minister to give a little more clarification of the situation in this regard. First, is it a fact as he suggests that the review of NATO strategy and NATO defence policy has still a long way to go before completion? If so, what view is the Canadian government taking on the issue of NATO strategy which is proposed to urge within NATO?

The minister referred to the support of the multilateral force. I understood this government to make it very clear in the past that it did not support Canada's participation in the multilateral force. We have not been told the reasons for that view, and I should like the minister to do so. I understood him to say