

Market, it is mainly to meet the economic challenge of the United States, and, therefore, would it not isolate Canada or push Canada towards the United States?

Hon. Mr. MARTIN: You mean if Britain got into the market would that not prejudice the Canadian position?

Senator FLYNN: Well, it would push us in a direction other than the one we are trying to take with the NATO Alliance.

Hon. Mr. MARTIN: I think it is only natural that Britain should have her eye on the large market that Europe affords. The population of Europe speaks for itself in terms of economic potential for Britain. It is not for Canada to say whether Britain should get into the Common Market. That is a decision for Britain. But while, admittedly, it might at the beginning cause some difficulties for us in agriculture, perhaps in newsprint, and perhaps in aluminum, it might likewise be that in the long term the benefits of British participation would inure to us, particularly if the Common Market were to widen and to become—what Senator MacKenzie envisaged a moment ago—part of the wider Atlantic community which would include the United States.

It is very much in the Canadian interest to think in terms of this community rather than to think in terms of a U.S.-Canadian common market arrangement. We should think in terms of a multilateral body including the United States, Great Britain and the European countries both in the Common Market and in EFTA.

This is the objective towards which we are striving, and part of the GATT discussions in Geneva, which are making some progress by the way, are directed towards this end.

Senator BROOKS: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Minister, I noticed that the minister emphasized the fact that there must be a balance among the deterrent forces. I was at the NATO conference in Paris last year.

Hon. Mr. MARTIN: Yes, I know that.

Senator BROOKS: And I know that there were nations there which were very much concerned over the situation at that time, owing to the fact that there had been a great change because France did not wish to integrate or have troops on her soil.

First, I would ask the minister if that situation has been adjusted? There was the question of pipe lines and bases and so on. This may be classified information; I do not know. But I know that Italy, for instance, was very much concerned that she was on the flank; she thought the whole defence had been divided on account of this move by France. Greece felt the same; Turkey felt the same, and then there were objections from Holland, Belgium and the nations on the other side. They felt that by having to move out of France it left too narrow a line between Germany and Russia. They felt that Germany was right up against the Russian attack, if there should be one, and that it left them no space to operate in. They also knew that the lines of communication from the ports in France which had been built up by NATO, and also the pipe lines which had been built up to what might have been or would have been a front line, had been very much disturbed.

This is one question I would like to ask: has that situation been adjusted?

Another point was whether the nuclear deterrent did not seem to our people more of a deterrent than the troops which were occupying what might be called the line between the Russians and ourselves. Of course, the forces which we had were more or less balanced with Russia's, but those nations felt that Russia had the edge with all the troops she had on the eastern front and with the eight or ten divisions she had in the Urals—those special troops which she could place in different positions at any time. I understand that the Russians had something