

reaching nature. They would destroy the balance of the agreements which resulted from long and arduous negotiations in which both sides made significant concessions. The amendments are wholly unacceptable to the Canadian fishing industry, to the provinces concerned and to the Federal Government.

We have conveyed to the U.S. Government at every level and on every possible occasion our concern that in the absence of co-operative arrangements for fisheries management there is a serious risk of confrontation between our respective fishermen on the East Coast. On April 23 the House reflecting this concern, unanimously adopted a motion urging the U.S. Senate to take early and favourable action for ratification of these treaties. In the year since the treaties were signed, we have witnessed a significant escalation of fishing effort in the Gulf of Maine by U.S. fishermen in a manner inconsistent with the purposes and objectives of the fisheries treaty and to the detriment of Canadian fishermen. If U.S. fishermen in the area continue or expand their current over-fishing we will have to take appropriate steps to protect our competitive position.

Beyond the important fisheries and resource issues at stake with the treaties, there is a broader question which arises from this impasse, with possible implications for other areas of Canada/U.S. relations. We understand and respect the internal processes of the U.S. governmental system. The problem of delays in ratification does, however, raise questions as to how Canada and the U.S. can best arrive at negotiated settlements to our problems. If, in future negotiations, Canada were to withhold concessions — in the expectation that we would face further negotiations when an agreement reaches the Senate — we might not be able to go beyond the first stage and reach a signed agreement. And if we did manage to reach a signed agreement, must we anticipate yet another round of negotiations with further demands for concessions from the U.S. Senate along with indefinite delays?

I am reviewing actively with the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans what steps might be taken to protect Canadian fishing interests in this situation.

Afghanistan

The global security environment was deteriorating for some time before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This was true in the confrontation of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, while the U.S.S.R.'s continuing, rapid build-up of practically all types of weapons had forced the NATO governments to respond in 1978 with the long-term defence program, and last year with the plan for theatre nuclear force modernization. It was true, as well, outside the NATO defence area where Cuban and Vietnamese troops, heavily supported by the Soviet Union, were engaged in active combat in Africa and Southeast Asia.

In this context, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused a particularly grave worsening of stability and understanding. For the first time since the Second World War, the Soviet Union used its troops to invade a country outside what is now the Warsaw Pact. In this sense, the Soviet action poses even a greater threat to world stability than did its earlier use of arms to suppress Hungary and Czechoslovakia. What is more, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan turns a former buffer state into a potential source of pressure or operations in Southwest Asia, and thus risks upsetting
