

way to direct collaboration with the UN in the prevention, management and settlement of conflicts.

Institutions and Structures

Helsinki left existing CSCE structures largely unaltered, while attempting to increase their efficiency. FUMs would be replaced by short "review conferences," preceding biennial summits. The Document confirmed the oversight and coordination functions of the Council and the CSO, and increased the support to the Chairman-in-Office (i.e. the Foreign Minister of the country designated host of the annual Council meeting) by formalizing three extant practices: the preceding and succeeding Chairmen could assist the present chair in a "troika"; the Chairman could call on ad hoc groups of a limited number of participating states to carry out certain tasks (a significant development in a process that had, until then, relied on plenary working bodies); and the Chairman could designate a personal representative to carry out clearly mandated tasks.

Most importantly, the FUM confirmed the rise of the CSO within the CSCE decision-making structure. As the agent of the Council, the CSO was now responsible for supervising and coordinating all CSCE activities. It was also given a central role in early warning and the political management of crises, peacekeeping operations and peaceful settlement of disputes (see below).

Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management

The focus of the FUM was the development of the CSCE's conflict prevention and crisis management capability. Canada chaired the working group responsible for drafting the relevant portions of the Helsinki Document. With the exception of peacekeeping, where substantial provisions were developed essentially from scratch, "development" meant attempting to create an ordered set of measures from the chaos of instruments and ad hoc procedures that had sprung up since Paris. This was done by establishing a spectrum into which mechanisms and institutions could be fitted, stretching from "early warning" through management of crisis on the ground. Initial discussion papers from Hungary and the UK reemerged as Hungarian and EC proposals which formed the basis for drafting a three-stage hierarchy of conflict prevention and management that met Canada's interests in developing a broad range of flexible instruments.

Early Warning and Preventive Action

In stage one, any state, group of states or the newly-created High Commissioner on National Minorities could bring an issue of concern to the attention of the CSO for action. Ideally this would allow the CSCE to identify emerging problems and galvanize political will to deal with them early on, before they resulted in violence -- which is exactly what Canada had been aiming at since its earliest proposals for crisis panels. Early warning was a Dutch concept, as was the proposal for a High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). The latter was conceived as an instrument for averting at an early stage conflicts involving national minorities or, if this proved impossible, for warning the CSO of potential conflict situations. The HCNM was expected to gather information on situations involving national minorities and, after consulting with the CSO, to go to the scene to obtain firsthand