

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

routine verification procedures. Much work remains to be done to understand all the consequences of the system of ad hoc checks, such as the types of chemical facilities or sites to be listed, the kind of checks inspectors may perform and the selection of the facilities or sites to be checked. In view of the potential importance of ad hoc checks within the overall system of verification of non-production, we consider serious in-depth discussion of this concept essential.

The convention will be a very complex agreement. We have already long since passed the point at which we can explain it to our children. Yet the need for logical consistency remains. In this connection, I would like to raise the issue of the need for schedule [4], or schedule [...] as it is now called, on super-toxic lethal chemicals. For my delegation the three dots are, for the time being, three question marks.

Three major reasons have been given for including schedule [4] in the convention. First, schedule [1] only lists STLCs that have actually been used to fill chemical munitions. According to the proponents, schedule [4] would have to cover other STLCs. It seems to us, however, that most chemicals liable for introduction in schedule [4] are unsuitable for chemical warfare. And if they are, they would be much better put into one of the other three schedules.

Second, it is argued that some of the facilities producing super-toxic materials may at present not be relevant for chemical warfare, but could none the less be used for producing chemical warfare agents. According to the proponents, such CW-capable facilities would be covered if a schedule [4] were introduced. However, this would only be a very partial solution, as most of the facilities with a capability for producing chemicals relevant to the convention would not fall under schedule [4]. In other words, facilities producing STLCs constitute only one amongst various categories with such a potential capability. An adequate system of ad hoc checks would in our view be much better to address these problems, as this would cover all relevant chemical facilities.

Third, proponents of schedule [4] apparently also consider such a scheme appropriate because it could offer the opportunity for verification of the non-development of chemical weapon agents. But in our view non-development is another issue that cannot be covered by a régime which is meant to check the non-production of known chemical weapon agents and their precursors in militarily relevant quantities. Development almost by definition implies that the agent is still unknown and that the quantities produced are irrelevant. If a verification régime for non-development is at all possible, it would be better taken up separately. In that case, we must address the question of what development exactly is - which stages must be passed before development becomes relevant with respect to the purposes of the convention. We may be able to elaborate some confidence-building measures, comparable to those agreed during the last review conference of the biological weapons Convention, which would suit the purpose.

All in all, it will require much time to resolve the complex issues of verifying non-production and related matters, taking also into account the