

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): In my statement today I propose to address some aspects of the future chemical weapons convention, an important subject to which the Conference on Disarmament continues to devote by far the greatest amount of its time.

Allow me to reiterate, at the very outset, our perception of what the chemical weapons convention should encompass. We support a comprehensive, effective and equitable treaty which prohibits the development, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use of chemical weapons, and which provides for the total destruction of existing stockpiles, production facilities and delivery systems of chemical weapons. A convention which contains anything less than these fundamental provisions would not enjoy universal support, and this would undermine the basic concept of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Let me also state once again for the record that Pakistan neither possesses chemical weapons nor desires to acquire them, and that it will continue to actively and positively contribute towards the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

The impetus that has been provided to our negotiations by the recent change in the United States position is timely, and we welcome it. In fact, it has made it possible for us to refine article I, which for the first time now clearly spells out the prohibition of use in a straight-forward manner. If we continue our work in the same spirit in the coming months, and show due regard for the views of all negotiating partners, there is no reason why a convention cannot be concluded by the end of 1992 as has already been resolved by us.

Confidence in compliance with the future chemical weapons convention lies at the heart of our negotiations. It would be too simplistic to build a vitally important disarmament convention only on the premise that States parties would adhere to it in good faith, and with the intention of abiding by its provisions. Provisions relating to verification and compliance will consequently have to establish a system which ensures that treaty obligations are being strictly observed. While 100 per cent effective compliance machinery does not appear within the realm of the possible, our endeavour is to create an equitable and efficacious verification system which maximizes confidence in the treaty provisions. It is obvious that the type and intrusiveness of verification to which an activity would be subjected should be determined by the element of risk which that particular activity poses for the convention.

The verification regime which we have been developing for the convention consists of two main elements, namely routine inspection under article VI and challenge inspection under article IX. I shall address these articles separately.

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