

J129(A82)

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Proposal Abstract J129(A82)

1. Arms Control Problem:

- Nuclear weapons - research and development
- comprehensive test ban
 - missile tests
 - cruise missiles
 - fissionable materials "cut off"

2. Verification Type:

- (a) Remote sensors - satellite
 - radar
 - ELINT
- (b) On-site inspection - selective
 - IAEA safeguards
- (c) Seismic sensors - intra-border stations
- (d) Short-range sensors - monitoring devices
 - seals

3. Source:

Niedergang, Mark. "Verification of a Nuclear Weapons Freeze".
Bulletin of Peace Proposals 13, no. 3, (1982).

4. Summary:

This article explores the verifiability of a nuclear freeze. It begins with an explanation of the concept of verification, and makes some basic assertions regarding the problems usually associated with verification. While challenges to the verifiability of a proposal should not be avoided, "one can assert with confidence that a freeze agreement could be made adequately verifiable" (p. 261). Past events show that verification is a stumbling block to agreement only where political will is absent.

Verification is a relative concept, so that the requisite level of verification which is deemed to be adequate will depend on certain criteria. An adequate verification technique will detect militarily significant treaty violations in a sufficiently timely manner to allow a nation to respond effectively. Arms control agreements are usually monitored through a combination of "national technical means" of verification and cooperative verification. National technical means gather data through spy satellites and listening posts which utilize photographic, infra-red, radar, radio and electronic sensors. They are unilateral, unlike cooperative means of verification which must be negotiated by both nations involved. Seismic installations, restrictions on concealment practices, on-site inspection and data exchange all require cooperative verification.