

day becoming intolerable the firing ceased by mutual consent. In this action the British lost 358 men in killed, wounded and missing, of which 59 died by *sunstroke*. The Americans lost 361 according to their own accounts. Gen. Clinton halted till 10 o'clock at night when he moved off unmolested, and continued his retreat, carrying such of his wounded as could bear conveyance away with him.

The Americans claim this day as a victory, but as they effected none of the objects for which the action was undertaken, and as Gen. Washington did not think fit to molest the British troops during their retreat but drew off even his corps of observation towards the Hudson. That claim can be hardly maintained, especially as his troops bivouacked three miles from the field of battle, and were only aware of the departure of the British at noon of the 26th, or some fourteen hours after they had moved off.

A dispute arose between Lee and Washington with reference to this action which led to the removal of the former General from the American service, although his conduct throughout was that of a good soldier and general officer. Washington's want of generalship was imputed to Lee in ordering the latter to advance and attack the British troops without supports insured what followed, and when Lee judiciously fell back Washington applied some insulting epithet to him on the field, and instead of awaiting the British attack in a strong position, advanced to be driven back with his whole force as Lee had been with the advance. The latter being an apostate Englishman had no chance against the "native American," but to be rewarded for his service, like all traitors, with disgrace.

Washington also blundered by attacking the British at Freehold, or Monmouth, with knowledge of the country the proper point to commence the attack was in advance of the Court House, where the road ran for five or six miles through a defile where the whole British army might have been entirely cut off with little exertion as there was neither room to fight or retreat. From this it would appear that his troops received a very severe check indeed, and it will explain the reasons of Clinton's march on the night of the 28th.

Stedman, the historian of this war, asks, "Why did Gen. Clinton encumber himself with so enormous a train of baggage? Why, when a rapid retreat was his object, did he halt the army without being fatigued by long marches for two days at Freehold? It was undoubtedly his business to gain a communication with the fleet as quickly as possible. At no time on the march did Gen. Clinton shew any other disposition than that of retreating to New York. Gen. Washington's caution is therefore censurable; he ought to have attacked so encumbered an army with all his light troops, and in spite of partial defeats contended in such favorable circumstances for ultimate victory."

Clinton could not destroy his baggage without serious loss of prestige, it could not be moved away by the fleet. The halt at Freehold was made to bring on the action at Monmouth for the purpose of securing a retreat. It was not in Washington's power to attack to advantage before, nor would he have done so on this occasion if Lee's counsel had prevailed, which, as noticed, was the same as that given by Stedman, and would have been the proper course for the American General to follow. In that case it is quite probable that all the baggage and a larger proportion of the British troops, if not the whole, would be captured. Sir H. Clinton was a good soldier but no General, and Washington's capacity was even less.

On the 5th of July the British troops embarked at Sandy Hook, and sailed for New York, and this city became the limits of the conquests of the British troops in the United States.

On the 15th of April a French fleet of twelve sail of the line and six frigates sailed from Toulon, under the command of Count D'Estaing, having on board a large body of troops. Owing to adverse winds it did not pass Gibraltar till the 15th of May. Authentic information of the sailing of this fleet reached the British cabinet on the 4th of May. Some of the Ministers being out of town a cabinet council was not held till the 6th, when it was decided to despatch a powerful squadron then at Portsmouth to America, but owing to the vacillating conduct of the Ministry it was detained till the 5th of June, and then thirteen sail of the line with some frigates sailed, under the command of Admiral the Hon. John Byron, better known as "Foul Weather Jack," for America.

In the House of Commons, which was about to adjourn, an appropriate address was moved by Ministers on receipt of the King's message, reciting the cause for war against France, in which the perfidy of the French in abetting and encouraging rebellion in North America, the obstinate resistance to all terms of compromise, the open preparations of Spain to take part in the hostilities so unnaturally provoked by France, the earnest desire of the British Government for peace, the measures which had been taken to accomplish that object, and their total failure were fairly stated. But the opposition, forgetting alike patriotism and honor, commenced a furious debate in which the King was accused of *falsehood* in uttering "a false, unjust, and illiberal slander on the commanders in the service of the Crown, loading them with censure, which ought to fall on Ministers alone." The address was carried notwithstanding by a majority of 263 against 113 in the Commons, and by a large majority in the House of Peers.

The reader will be at no loss to trace the cause of the success of the rebellion in North America, nor why a gallant army was dis-

graced by incompetent commanders, and the military operations purposely mismanaged.

After a voyage of eighty-seven days the French squadron arrived and anchored at the entrance of Delaware Bay. It was on the 6th of July that the French fleet arrived off the coast, the same day on which Clinton's retreating army embarked at Sandy Hook, where a British squadron, under Lord Howe, consisting of the *Eagle*, 64; *Trident*, 64; *Preston*, 50; *Nonsuch*, *Somerset*, *St. Albans*, and *Ardent*, 64-gun ships; *Iris*, 50; *Roebuck* and *Phoenix*, 44 guns; *Pearl*, 32; *Vigilant*, 20; three fireships, two mortar vessels, and four galleys lay. On the 7th July the 28-gun frigate *Maidstone* arrived with despatches announcing she had seen the French squadron off the coast of Virginia, and had seen it anchor in the Delaware on the 6th. On the 11th the *Zelra* brought information that on the evening before she had fallen in with a fleet of twelve sail of two-decked ships under French colors steering for New York. At noon on the same day the French fleet hove in sight, and in the course of the afternoon came to anchor off Shrewsbury Inlet, four miles from Sandy Hook. The fleet consisted of the following ships: *Languedor*, 90; *Tourant*, 80; *César*, *Zélé*, *Hector*, *Protecteur*, *Marseillois*, and *Guerriere*, 74-gun ships; *Provence*, *Fantassque*, 64-guns; *Sagittar*, 54; *Tlèche*, *Amiable*, *Alcmène*, *Chemero*, and *Engageant*, 28-gun frigates, and *Eclairé*, 16 gun sloop. Under those circumstances Howe's position was sufficiently perilous, and if D'Estaing possessed the dash or capability of Nelson an attempt would have been made to bring the British to action.

The sight, however, of the French colors blockading English ships so enraged the crews of the merchantmen and transports that they volunteered to a man, and masters and mates were found ready to take their stations at guns on board Howe's squadron, lots had to be drawn to decide what portion of troops would be allowed to go on board so eager were all to volunteer.

Howe had made the best possible use of his time. His squadron lay at anchor in Amboy Bay. He at once moved them out behind the bar which stretched from Sandy Hook to Staten Island, and which formed the entrance to the harbor; he formed them into two lines with the worst vessels and frigates as a reserve, and with two springs on their cables, eagerly awaited the conflict. On the south-west point of the spit or hook two batteries were erected and those were covered by four battalions posted to prevent the French effecting a landing.

The fate of the British army depended on the fleet, and only one feeling pervaded the latter, an intense desire to fight. But such was not the intention of the French Admiral, who remained taking in water and provisions till the 21st of July; the wind being then favorable he got under weigh and pass-