

young and old, rich and poor, eagerly came forward to defend their King and Country, and by their example and influence, they afforded to the unprepared Government, the means of resisting the invasion of the enemy, until the arrival of the necessary assistance from the mother Country.

The Canadians have in this manner, repeated the most unquestionable proofs of their loyalty, of their attachment to the Constitution of the Empire, and of their devotedness to their King. These feelings are part of their very essence, and transmitted to them from generation to generation, and one may boldly assert, that they will pass as heirlooms to their posterity. Here, however, a question arises, namely; how is it then that in spite of such loyal feelings, Government so often meets with resistance and opposition? The solution of this apparent contradiction, is rather of a delicate nature. Let us try, however, to enter upon it; it may lead to the means of removing the cause of that resistance and opposition, and of restoring that harmony, from which alone the prosperity of this Colony can proceed.

We have heard repeatedly, and especially during the American revolutionary war, heavy complaints of a real or supposed influence, which ruled behind the curtain his Majesty's Councils. The British Constitution has very wisely set a barrier against the abuse of the immense power necessarily vested in a single individual screened against any responsibility, by inviolability, and by his being declared incapable of doing wrong. The whole of that responsibility rests on the *ostensible* and *well known* advisers of the Crown, namely on the ministers. So much the worse for them if they suffer their master or themselves to be led into improper measures by advisers neither known or acknowledged as such. Here therefore, the danger of inviolability cannot be very great, but suppose now that there be no real advisers either known or acknowledged as such, on whom shall fall the public vengeance in case of palpable transgressions, certainly not on that Chief Magistrate whom you have pronounced inviolable. In that case influence is dangerous, and the least evil that it can produce, must be a kind of uneasy sensation in the mind of those who suffer from it. There follows of course, a certain distrust, which makes the governed watch with a jealous eye, all the measures of Government, and leads to resistance and opposition.

But, will it be asked; what is the ground of suspicion that such an influence exists in this Country? If that which has been said before be not a sufficient answer to the question, we shall be ready at any time and when required, to state more particularly those grounds. Our intention does not go farther for the present, than to account for that want of harmony between the several branches of the Legislature, and for that kind of resistance and opposition which government too often meets on the part of the popular branch.

C. D. E.

*To be continued.*