

2. The main difficulty I see is that some of the proposals in the paper are slanted to overcome probable Soviet objections and tend to ignore objections which the Western nuclear powers have to anything which could be construed as an “uncontrolled moratorium.”³² It has become evident that USA unwillingness to sacrifice requirement for a limited number of on-site inspections³³ has been stiffened by the Cuban experience. In these circumstances, the suggestions in reference telegram for the steps the International Commission would be empowered to take to verify a suspicious event, would be open to vigorous objections from the Western nuclear powers.³⁴ Specifically the provisions that on-site inspection could take place only with the concurrence of the state on whose territory the event occurs would probably be regarded at the moment by USA as an unacceptable surrender to Soviet position.³⁵

3. Regardless of whether the procedure suggested in paragraphs 3(iii), 3(iv), and 3(v) would in fact yield sufficient assurance of compliance with the agreement,³⁶ it is questionable whether a proposal aimed at breaking the present deadlock by means of an interim arrangement should specify a procedure which the Western nuclear powers could, with some justice, claim would set a precedent for the final accord.³⁷ For the interim arrangements to be truly interim, the major function of the interim International Commission during the transitional period should surely be an objective investigation of what is actually needed to verify compliance with a permanent agreement. Hence I believe it would be preferable as an initial proposal to suggest a very limited number of obligatory inspections perhaps accompanied by additional inspection by invitation during the interim period.³⁸ Throughout this period the Commission would continually review its procedures, examine ways of improving the detection network, etc., with the aim of formulating a recommendation whether under the final agreement obligatory inspections were or were not repeat not indispensable.³⁹

4. Admittedly at the moment there is little evidence USSR would accept on-site inspection on these terms. However, in present circumstances I believe this idea should be pursued and might possibly be acceptable to the Russians if it could be agreed that the composition of the International Commission would give its neutral scientists the deciding voice concerning

³² Note marginale :/Marginal note:

This misses the point of our proposal – it seeks to protect Western position to greatest possible extent while offering something that Soviet[s] might find it possible to accept. [K.D. McIlwraith?]

³³ Note marginale :/Marginal note:

The US has whittled this down to practically nothing already – all we are asking is that it be shaved down a bit more, not to nothing. [K.D. McIlwraith?]

³⁴ Note marginale :/Marginal note:

Has Gen. Burns already sounded US & UK reps., I wonder. [K.D. McIlwraith?]

³⁵ Note marginale :/Marginal note:

This ignores our key provision that a refusing state must satisfy the Int[ernational] Com[mission] that a doubtful event was *not a test*. [K.D. McIlwraith?]

³⁶ Note marginale :/Marginal note:

How can we *disregard* an important feature of our proposed procedure? [K.D. McIlwraith?]

³⁷ Note marginale :/Marginal note:

But our proposal virtually accepts the view that on site inspection may in certain instances be the only sure method of verification. [K.D. McIlwraith?]

³⁸ Note marginale :/Marginal note:

This is tantamount to accepting US position and ruling out any possibility of Soviet acceptance. [K.D. McIlwraith?]

³⁹ Note marginale :/Marginal note:

Soviet technicians will probably never be allowed to agree that they are “indispensable.” [K.D. McIlwraith?]