

*Mr. Monk's Resignation.*

Our present attitude sufficiently appears in our naval statute:

"In case of an emergency, the Governor-in-Council *may* place at the disposal of His Majesty, for general service in the royal navy, the naval service, or any part thereof" etc.

Mr. Borden disagreed with the permissive word *may*, and moved (3 February, 1910) as follows:

"The proposals of the government do not follow the suggestions and recommendations of the Admiralty, and, in so far as they empower the government to withhold the naval forces of Canada from those of the Empire in time of war, are ill-advised and dangerous" (a).

Mr. Borden's resolution was defeated, and the permissive word was retained as part of the bill.

Our present attitude appears in our agreement with the British government that our war-ships are to be "exclusively" under our own control and fly our own flag (b).

Our present attitude appears in the arrangements made with the British government at the sub-conference of 1909. The main point was

"That each part of the Empire is willing to make its preparations on such lines as will enable it, *should it so desire*, to take its share in the general defence of the Empire" (c).

In reporting that agreement to the House of Commons, Mr. Asquith said:

"The result is a plan for so organising the forces of the Crown wherever they are, that while preserving the complete autonomy of each Dominion, *should the Dominions desire to assist in the defence of the Empire in a real emergency*, their forces could be rapidly combined into one homogeneous imperial army" (d).

Our present attitude is not only perfectly clear and thoroughly understood and accepted by the British government, but it is in perfect accordance with the traditional principles of the Colonial Office. Mr. Keith, one of the best informed men in that department, when discussing the right of a Governor-General to place colonial troops under a British officer, said that such

(a) Haas, p. 2991.

(b) Cd. 8746-2, p. 1.

(c) Cd. 4948, p. 19. See also p. 38.

(d) Ibid. p. 19.