

tainty and vexation of another submission of her claims to arbitration; and left it to the Senate, the constituted authority appointed for the purpose, to decide on the general merits of the treaty, as it relates to the whole Union. In so doing, she has, in his opinion, acted wisely and patriotically—wisely for herself, and patriotically in reference to the rest of the Union. She has not got, indeed, all she desired; and has even lost territory, if the treaty be compared to the award of the King of Holland; but, as an offset, that which she has lost is of little value, while that which she retains has been greatly increased in value by the stipulations contained in the treaty. The whole amount lost, is about half a million of acres—it lies along the eastern slope of the highlands, skirting the St. Lawrence to the east, and is acknowledged to be of little value for soil, timber, or anything else—a sterile region, in a severe inhospitable clime. Against that loss, she has acquired the right to navigate the river St. John; and that, not only to float down the timber on its banks, but all the productions of the extensive, well-timbered, and taken as a whole, not a sterile portion of the State that lies on her side of the bosom of that river and its tributaries. But that is not all. She also gains what is vastly more valuable—the right to ship them on the same terms as colonial productions to Great Britain and her colonial possessions.

These great and important advantages will probably double the value of that extensive region, and make it one of the most populous and flourishing portions of the State. Estimated by a mere moneyed standard, these advantages are worth, he would suppose, all the rest of the territory claimed by Maine without them. If to this be added the sum of about \$200,000 to be paid her for the expense of defending her territory, and \$300,000 to her and Massachusetts in equal moieties, in consequence of their assent to the boundary and the equivalents received, it must be apparent that Maine has not made a bad exchange in accepting the treaty, as compared with the award, as far as her separate interest is concerned. But be that as it may, she is the rightful judge of her own interests; and her assent is a sufficient ground for our assent, provided that to which she has assented does not involve too great a sacrifice on the part of the rest of the Union, nor their honor or safety. So far from that, as far as the rest of the Union is concerned, the sacrifice is small and the gain great. They are under solemn constitutional obligations to defend Maine, as one of the members of the Union, against invasion, and to protect her territory, cost what it may, at every hazard. The power, claiming what she contended to be hers, is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, on earth; the dispute is of long standing, and of a character difficult to be adjusted; and, however clear the right of Maine may be regarded in the abstract, it has been made doubtful, in consequence of admissions, for which the Government of the Union is responsible. To terminate such a controversy, with the assent of the party immediately interested, by paying the small sum of half a million—of which a large part (say \$200,000) is unquestionably due to Maine, and would have to be paid to her without the treaty—is indeed a small sacrifice, a fortunate deliverance. President Jackson was willing to allow her, as has been stated, more than twice as much for her assent to the award; and in doing so, he showed his wisdom, whatever might have been thought of it at the time.

Those, at least, who opposed the treaty, will not charge him with being willing to sacrifice the interest and honor of the Union in making the offer; and yet the charge which they make against this portion of the treaty does, by implication, subject what he was ready to do to a similar one.

But it is said that the territory which England would acquire beyond the boundary of the awarded line, would greatly strengthen her frontier, and weaken ours; and would thereby endanger the safety of the country in that quarter. He did not profess to be deeply versed in military science; but, according to his conception, there was no foundation for the objection. It was, if he did not mistake, the very last point on our whole frontier, from the mouth of the St. Croix to the outlet of Lake Superior, on which an expedition would be organized on either side to attack the possessions of the other. In a military point of view, our loss is as nothing in that quarter; while in another, and a much more important quarter, our gain by the treaty is great, in the same point of view. He referred to that provision by which we acquire Rouse's Point, at the northern extremity of Lake Champlain. It is among the most important military positions on the whole line of our eastern and northern frontier, whether it be regarded in reference to offensive or defensive operations. He well remembered the deep sensation caused among military men in consequence of its loss; and he would leave the question of loss or gain, in a military point of view, (taking the two together,) to their decision, without the least doubt that it would be.

But if it should be thought by any one that these considerations, as conclusive as they seemed to be, were not sufficient to justify the ratification of this portion of the treaty, there were others, which appeared to him to be perfectly conclusive. He referred to the condition in which we would be left, if the treaty should be rejected. He would ask—if, after having agreed at Ghent to refer the subject to arbitration, and, after having refused to agree to the award made under that reference, by an arbitrator of our own selection, we should now reject this treaty, negotiated by our own Secretary of State, under our own eyes, and which had previously received the assent of the States immediately interested—whether there would be the slightest prospect that another equally favorable would ever be obtained. On the contrary, would we not stand in a far worse condition than ever, in reference to our claim? Would it not, indeed, be almost certain that we should lose the whole of the basin of the St. John, and Great Britain gain all for which she ever contended, strengthened as she would be by the disclosures made during this discussion? He was

\* The following extract from the speech of Mr. Rives, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, will show what the disclosures were:

It appears to the committee, therefore, in looking back to the public and solemn acts of the Government, and of its successive administrations, that the time has passed, if it ever existed, when we could be justified in making the precise line of boundary claimed by us the subject of a *sine qua non* of negotiation, or of the *ultimo ratio*—of an assertion by force. Did a second arbitration, then, afford the prospect of a more satisfactory result? This expedient seemed to be equally rejected by all parties—