

or secular interests, or sought to prevent the Church from doing injury to such interests; and on this the conclusion is founded, that in so far as jurisdiction in spiritual matters is concerned, the independence of the Church has been in no way invaded. All this no doubt, is fitted to puzzle plain men, who do not happen to have full means of information. A few words of explanation, however, will clear up the difficulty, and show upon whose heads the sin "of something like falsehood" is to be laid.

It is to be observed, then, that the civil courts do not claim, absolutely, the right of interfering with, or controlling the action of Church courts in purely spiritual matters,—they do not pretend to be spiritual courts, in other words, or to have a direct right of review in things purely spiritual;—in this respect, they would, doubtless, assent to such general statements as those of Lord Cunningham. Neither, again, have they interfered with the Church, except on the plea, that some civil interest was affected by the decisions of the Church;—the general statements of our opponents on this subject are *so far* correct. But, then, mark well the principle on which they base their claims to a right of interference with the Church, and you will find that it places the Church under their control in spiritual matters, almost as completely as she could be, if they claimed a direct right, *as superior spiritual courts*, to review all her proceedings. That principle is, that wherever a civil interest is affected by the decision of a Church court, they have a right to interfere, and to interfere, (let this be specially noticed), not merely for the purpose of dealing with the civil interest involved, and giving civil redress in regard to it, *but for the purpose of suspending or annulling spiritual acts,—of enjoining, under the threat of civil penalties, the performance of spiritual functions,—*and, in one word, of exercising, for civil ends, and by means of the compulsitors of civil law, as absolute a control over the action of the courts of the Church, as they could exercise if they were themselves spiritual courts, and possessed, as such, of a direct right of review in all spiritual matters.

Thus, to illustrate, by a reference to the actual procedure of these courts, suppose a probationer is presented to a parish by the patron, they do not pretend, it is true, to have any right to review, as a *spiritual matter*, what is done by the Presbytery with regard to his ordination,—this would be too monstrous even for them,—but, on the ground that a civil interest, viz., the right of the presentee to the stipend, is affected by the procedure of the Church courts, they