

case of repeated offences, it comes to be limited solely by the length of the term of imprisonment awarded to inveterate offenders.

The second object of punishment, as above stated, is retribution. It is quite hopeless to urge that this element should not be taken into account. Unless the desire for vengeance is in some way gratified by the law, the injured party takes the law into his own hands. Besides, if justice is retributive, it has a better deterrent effect. It stands in a sort of way in the place of compensation. The prisoner pays with his body. But, for practical purposes, this object need not be kept so clearly in view by the judge as the first object of prevention of further crime. A punishment which is sufficient to secure the prevention of further crime is generally sufficient to satisfy the party actually injured.

The third and last object of punishment is the reformation of the criminal. If a punishment is sufficient to prevent a criminal, either by its deterrent effect or by main force during its continuance, from the further commission of crime, that is the utmost extent of reformation with which punishment has practically to do. It cannot be altogether lost sight of in inflicting punishment, because it is to that extent involved in the first object of punishment, namely, the prevention of crime. But a real reformation consists not only in ceasing to do evil, but in learning to do good. And it is plain that the teaching of how to do good can scarcely be accomplished within the same period that will suffice for the first half of the lesson, namely, as to ceasing to do evil.

In the debate in the House of Lords, Lord Herschell at first asked the Government whether they would cause inquiry to be made by Royal Commission, Committee, or otherwise, into our present system of punishments and the principles which should guide its administration, and whether it was possible to diminish the unequal incidence of punishments and to render them more effectual. At the conclusion of the debate he merely expressed a hope that the Government would give the matter early attention, and that if no other inquiry was made than that by themselves, they would, before proposing any legislation, favour the House with returns or statistics as to the results of light sentences where they had been tried.

Lord Coleridge thought that the establishment of a Court of Criminal Appeal would have a most powerful effect in promoting greater uniformity of sentences. A steady course of decisions by such a court, disregarding as it would all emotional feelings which tended to warp the judgment, would certainly, he believed, have that effect, for those who inflicted sentences would know that they were subject to revision. But if there was to be a Court of Appeal it must have the power, not only of reducing punishment, but also of increasing inadequate sentences. He did not desire that the Court should simply diminish punishment; he desired to make it useful in accordance with the righteous sentiment of the community.

There may be, with deference, room for doubt whether the constitution of a Court of Criminal Appeal would not do more harm than good in regard to inequality of sentences. As a rule the criminal classes are poor, and would have