against another defendant at another time, but only one final judgment could be entered against the same defendant. On the other hand in the Court of Chancery it was equally familiar practice that a decree could be pronounced against a defendant at one stage of the cause, disposing of part of the matters in controversy, and reserving further directions to a subsequent stage of the suit—usually after the Master had made his report as to certain matters referred to him—and upon the cause coming on again for hearing on further directions, the Court was accustomed to pronounce a further decree or judgment against the same defendant, either finally disposing of the remaining matters in controversy, or else disposing of some of them and again reserving "further directions" for future disposition. Thus, as often as the cause came on again, a fresh decree or judgment was pronounced; and in this way, in a Chancery suit, there might be several decrees or judgments pronounced in the same action against the same defendant before all the matters in litigation were finally disposed of, and this was necessary from the nature of the relief administered in Equity.

Now, in the Queen's Bench and Common Pleas Divisions, notwithstanding these Divisions are now in effect also Courts of Chancery, and have cognizance of purely equitable causes of action, the old common law theory, that there can be only one judgment, is still rigidly adhered to; while in the Chancery Division every decision rendered in an action, which under the former practice would be styled a decree, is now regarded as a judgment, and is so entered. Thus, in many cases in the Queen's Bench and Common Pleas Divisions, an order is issued, when, in the Chancery Division, in an exactly similar state of facts, a judgment is entered.

Then again when a motion for judgment is made under Rules 322 or 324, a wide difference of procedure prevails. In the Queen's Bench and Common Pleas Divisions an order is drawn up authorizing the judgment to be entered in accordance with the decision of the Court, and after this order is issued a judgment is then drawn up in accordance with the order, and entered. On the other hand, in the Chancery Division the decision of the Court upon the motion is not formulated into an order to enter judgment, but the decision is formulated as a judgment which is thereupon entered without any preliminary order.

Under Rule 80, an order to enter judgment in accordance with the indorsement on the writ is the practice expressly prescribed by the Rule. But when a motion for judgment is made under Rules 211, 322, 324, the Court pronounces the judgment, and it would seem more in accordance with the intention of the Act and Rules that the document to be drawn up should be the judgment pronounced, and not a mere order to enter judgment. The practice of the Chancery Division in this respect has certainly less of circumlocution and greater simplicity than that adopted in the other divisions.

This is by no means a solitary point of practice in which a difference exists, and we think it is to be regretted. There are numerous other points in the administration of the Judicature Act and Rules in which the officers of the Court, relying on their former traditions, are practically creating a different system of practice in the different Divisions, and these differences are for the most part at present beyond judicial control, from the fact that the questions of difference can rarely come under the attention of the judges, and therefore their opinion as to what is the proper practice of two divergent methods cannot be obtained.

We believe that it will be very difficult to remedy this state of things, until the