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If our Little band of 3000 foldiers, could be drawn off from the defence of a frontier of 5000 miles, and from our tottering forts, more dangerous to their defenders than their affailants, and if Mr. Jefferson could by the force of reason, persuade our enemies to enter a small defile, like that of Thermopylæ, perhaps even this little knot of heroes might be immortalized by victory. So also, if our enemies would be graciously pleased to run their line of battle ships aground in convenient numbers, Mr. Jefferson's naval force would be found very effective, or, which would be still more convenient, and good humoured on the part of our enemies, if they would send one ship at a time, to permit Mr. Fulton to make three or four experiments, we could in the course of two years, destroy the British navy.

But we have 100,000 militia, and we can by the very cheap process of an act of Congress, increase this number at pleasure. If the war was to be a defensive one, like the last, it must be admitted, that this species of sorce may be calculated upon. But the militia cannot be marched out of the United States, and we have no use for them within.

But they would volunteer their fervices to take Canada and Nova-Scotia.—I do not fay that this achievement is impossible; but I am surprised, that our publick writers should be so little sparing of our feelings, as to recal those two scenes of our missfortune.—The plains of Abraham, and the Isthmus of Penobscot, exhibit no honourable monuments of either our power or conduct.

But perhaps we might have better fuccess in another attempt; perhaps with the loss of twenty thousand men, and the expense of fifty millions of dollars, we might take, and [urrifon those provinces, with the exception of the city of Quebeck; that city we probably could not take.* Suppose us then in quiet possession of these

^{*} It is furprifing with what confidence men who are totally ignorant of theftate of thefe provinces, boaft of taking them at a froke. Quebeck was in a ruinous fituation when attacked before, and yet we failed in our attempt, though we had two armies before it.—It has fince, been thoroughly fortified, and is now the Gibraltar of America. We have no reason to doubt, that it would hold out against the webole French army, at least as long as Dantzick. We on the other hand, are destinate of engineers, or onlitary skill inflicient for such an operation. But we shall be told, that we shall have French officers, French skill. French artillery.—And is this our confolition? Hie metus! heu libertas!