

or Mr. Gladstone, whom we suspect to have been the author of the idea,—fancied a time had come at which it would be possible to negotiate a treaty with the Americans which would please them without absolutely empowering them to sell up the British empire. To almost anything short of this he appears to have been ready to agree. During the Washington conferences Lord Granville stood behind the commissioners, ordering them by telegraph to concede and to submit, whenever they showed signs of resisting some demand rather more startling than usual. From first to last their proceedings seem to have been little more than a registration of the terms on which the American Government was willing to receive the submission of this country. If the Government of Mr. Gladstone had cared to maintain any decent show of insisting that the negotiations should be conducted on a system of reciprocity, they would have firmly persevered in requiring that arrangements should be made for obtaining an arbitration on our claims in respect of Fenian raids on Canada. Whatever complaints the Americans can make against us, for having shown unfriendly negligence in letting the 'Alabama' escape, we might bring complaints against them of an unfriendliness tenfold greater, shown in repeatedly permitting the organisation within their territory of regular military expeditions designed to make war upon the Queen's dominions. But the Fenian raid claims were given up by our Government for no better reason than because the American people were said to be resolved never to listen to these claims. The American people seem to be regarded by Mr. Gladstone's Government with mingled emotions of fear, and anxiety to please, which combine to render its claims tremulous in their diffidence; its concessions servile in their eagerness.

The commissioners, urged forward by the Foreign Office, hastened when the conferences opened to accumulate their peace offerings in a heap at the feet of the American negotiators. At the outset of their proceedings, they imparted a wholly new character to the treaty under preparation, by inserting, in accordance with Lord Granville's instructions, an apology for the escape of the 'Alabama.' Of course the theory of the treaty was that a future arbitration had to decide whether that escape carried with it any reproach to this country or not; but without the apology, say the defenders of the treaty, the American people would never have accepted it. It is odd that this excuse should be considered sufficient, because the treaty which we are thus supposed to have purchased by means of the apology, is in itself a concession—an enormous concession to the United States. We derive no advantage from it ourselves—none, at all events worth speaking of—except the hope that the United States may, under

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its influence. However, three rules by this time was no longer free and should be it should drawn up liable to by such a it. But home, the exactly felt might, perhaps heavy damage had never to the United States which the would be unlikely to was more asserted that betrayed.

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The the liability of up, but that is bound partial preparation for hostile peace. for the supplies and on the liable to pay damages their income the Federal to Mr. A