

*External Affairs*

and expressing the hope that progress toward this might soon be made. Should the communist position on these matters change we would favour resumption of negotiations.

How could such negotiations best be conducted if the circumstances were propitious for them? The Korean question remains before the United Nations; yet it is clear now, of course, that it cannot be peacefully resolved without the concurrence of the North Korean and Chinese communist governments, governments which are not members of the United Nations and which have defied its charter.

At Geneva negotiations were conducted outside of the United Nations but in conformity with its principles. If further efforts to unify Korea peacefully are to be made then the United Nations will have to face the problem of finding an acceptable procedure for sponsoring negotiations which, to have any chance of success, will have to include these two non-members, North Korea and communist China.

And now, Mr. Speaker, I should say something about Formosa, the third sector of what I might call this Far Eastern front. I should like to try to explain as briefly as possible why the situation which has arisen in the Formosa strait is so worrying, and indeed so potentially explosive; particularly our own concern with and relationship to that situation. On the substance of the matter I have not very much to add to what I said in the house in January and last month, because the policy I stated then has not been altered. But there have been certain new developments.

It is reassuring, for instance, that the evacuation of thousands of civilians and soldiers from the Tachen and Nankishen islands has taken place without any serious incident. The decision to evacuate these islands was, if not an easy one, certainly a wise one for the Chinese nationalist government to make. The Chinese communists wisely did not attempt to interfere with these operations. Their completion without warlike incident does show at least that hostilities can be avoided in operations of this kind if restraint is exercised on both sides.

There is naturally much concern in all our minds—and that concern has been voiced in the house—as to what the Chinese communists have in mind regarding Formosa and those few coastal islands which still remain in the hands of the Chinese nationalists. It is devoutly to be hoped that the Chinese communists do not, by the use of force, renew the war over those islands, the consequences of which might spread further. Yet their

words do not give us much comfort in this regard, if we are to judge their future actions by their past words.

It has been argued, especially by some of our Asian friends, that the leaders of the Peking government are inspired more by Chinese than by communist aspirations; more by the desire to work out a national revolution than to precipitate an international one by interference in the affairs of their neighbours. True, they have embarked—that is the Peking government—upon an enormous program of industrial and agricultural development, and it would seem foolhardy for them to risk all this in military adventures. Unfortunately, however, it is not possible to count upon the wisdom or restraint of a regime of this kind. The combination of national revolutionary fervour with the messianic delusions of communist ideology have in the past and can in the future prove dangerous. The Chinese communists may not be intent upon a career of Asian aggression and expansion, but their determination to pursue what they claim to be their legitimate interests has already led them to ignore the legitimate interests and security of other peoples, and may do so again. And that possibility certainly contains a serious threat to peace.

And so we cannot ignore in this connection the communist intention, loudly and frequently proclaimed, to attack and occupy Formosa and the islands. We can, however, having regard to declared United States policy to help in the defence of Formosa, retain strong doubts about their capacity to achieve this objective in the near future by any direct assault. To maintain an amphibious or airborne attack 100 miles across the Formosa strait would be a hazardous operation for a land power like communist China and would certainly strain its as yet limited resources, much more than did the operations in Korea.

The chairman of the United States joint chiefs of staff, Admiral Radford, was asked in an interview a few weeks ago what he thought of the Chinese communists' ability to carry out their threat to, as they put it, liberate Formosa. Admiral Radford's reply was:

They cannot do it at this time. They just do not have the military capability to carry out an amphibious operation of the scale required, particularly in view of the announced United States position and the immediate availability of United States naval and air forces to counter such an operation.

That was Admiral Radford's conclusion, and that same conclusion has led many to doubt that the communists have in mind an invasion of the coastal islands of Quemoy and Matsu as a prelude to or part of an attack