

*Committee on Defence Expenditures*

satellite nations which are under Russian direction today? Unless and until we can answer that question in the affirmative, our plan for defence is being carried forward in an atmosphere of complete and hopeless unreality.

It is obvious that the places where the ultimate issues as to world peace or world war are going to be decided are in Europe and the Middle East rather than in Korea, unless some wholly unexpected development there should precipitate something which cannot now be foreseen. It is perfectly clear that, with the strength which has been built up in Korea, the line now held by the forces of the United Nations can be held indefinitely. It would seem that at any time the commanding officers of the United Nations forces in Korea found any reason to advance those lines, they could do so. There are other places in the world where, in recent years, static positions have been held for long periods, creating a situation that somewhat resembled a fortress. There is, in fact, just such a situation on the Suez canal today where the British, without open warfare, are occupying an area in order to protect the life lines to the east. This is an old and historic situation and one which might continue for a long time. But outside of something wholly unexpected happening in Korea, the place where the danger lies is in Europe and the Middle East. That being so, we see quite clearly that the place where the strength must be accumulated to prevent war—and that is the purpose of all that we are doing—is bound to be many thousands of miles away from Canada. That being so, the first and patently obvious step would seem to be to organize our defence forces with that reality primarily in our minds, and to organize our forces in such a way that the forces we are called upon to move by sea or air at any time will have the highest possible hitting power for the least number of men. No other plan answers the most elementary logistics of military preparation.

It is considerably more than a year ago since I urged in this house, as others have done, that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should rationalize the organization, training and equipment of the units supplied from the various member countries of that organization, in a way that would produce the greatest possible military force in the critical areas, with full recognition of the problems of transportation and supply. Surely if logistics—to use the extremely expressive term that was so frequently employed during the last war—are to be applied at all in this case, it would seem that economy of effort would suggest that those forces which have the lowest hitting power per man and can

be raised near the danger spot should be raised there, whereas the forces which must be moved a long distance should be forces with the highest possible measure of hitting power. Every single man that is moved thousands of miles away from Canada involves not only the movement of that man and his equipment, but also a commitment to move food, supplies, ammunition and all the other requirements of the men in the field over thousands of miles, which, in the event of war itself, would be threatened by the most modern aircraft and the most modern submarines. A simple rational approach to this problem suggests that here in Canada we should not be training the mass formations with low individual hitting power; we should be training fast hard-hitting armoured units, with the highest possible hitting power per man. We should also be concentrating, as we have been told we would concentrate, on the air power which can be moved with the utmost safety to any danger point, or for that matter to any part of the world.

With this situation in front of us, it seems clear that the United States and Canada, each in proportion to its own producing capacity, must, to a very considerable extent, be the arsenals of Europe, and to a substantial degree the rest of the world as well. That being so, it would seem that our effort should be directed to supplying the weapons and equipment of all types needed for the land forces in these critical areas where the men can be raised, armed, equipped and trained, while we concentrate on compact, hard-hitting and extremely mobile forces which can make the most effective use of the transportation supplies available, whether by air or by sea.

Let me illustrate what I mean. Our present contribution to the combined forces under General Eisenhower is at this time the 27th infantry brigade, which is now in the process of being moved to Europe, and one fighter squadron of the Royal Canadian Air Force, now in training in the United Kingdom. In so far as the forces under General Eisenhower are concerned, I understand it is the intention that the bomber and fighter squadrons are to be sent to Europe. That is not possible, however, at this time because adequate airfields are not available. One of the reasons that airfields have not been available is first of all the difficulty of acquiring land in areas of such concentrated population; but second, and more decisive, is the fact that they have not been able to divert men with technical experience to carry out the construction of these great enterprises as they would wish to do. Under these circumstances, is it not possible that we can do much