mation," he would call the hon. gentleman's attention to the Act of 1869, with reference to procedure before Justices in cases of summary convictions. It stated: "Every complaint and information shall be heard, tried, and determined and adjudged," and so on. Hence the language used in this Bill corresponded with that used in the Act relating to summary proceedings. The word "trial" was, perhaps, not so apt or appropriate as the word "hearing," but, as the hon. member for North York had mentioned that the hon. member for Grey intended to move an amendment to alter the words "hearing of the information," he thought that perhaps it would be better to adopt it as being more appropriate; but still he felt that the language of the Bill in that respect would not create any difficulty, and was in accordance with the Act relating to the trial of summary informations before magistrates.

MR. MILLS said the Bill, as it stood, really did not introduce any new principle; but the adoption of the amendment suggested by the hon. member for Kingston would be the introduction of an entirely new principle. He did not see how the hon. gentleman could stop at the line drawn by this amendment. The provisions of the Bill proceeded on this assumption: that it was quite possible that a party who was the defendant ought to have been the plaintiff, and so, instead of going before another magistrate to make a complaint, he was afforded the opportunity of giving his evidence before the magistrate before whom he was brought for trial. Practically, therefore, the provisions of this Bill did not made any innovation upon the law of evidence as it stood; but, if the amendment of the hon. member for Kingston was adopted, there was no reason why it should not be extended to every other case of criminal procedure, or why, if such a party was compelled to appear as a witness on behalf of the Crown in a case of common assault, he should not be compelled to so appear in a case of arson, perjury, or murder, or any other criminal offence. The House ought, therefore, seriously to consider the proposition of the hon. member for Kingston, before adopting it. This would be a very great innovation upon the principles of English criminal jurisprudence. The House would then be, in fact, introducing the system of inquisitorial procedure, because, if, in the case of a common assault, the person accused could be compelled to appear and give testimony against himself, there was no reason why the Crown should not compel the accused to so appear in another case, however heinous it might be. This Bill, as it stood, was no innovation on the present law. There was now nothing to prevent an accused party from appearing before another magistrate and giving his testimony upon oath, thereby becoming the complainant; but, if the House adopted this amendment, he did not think that it could stop there, and they would be obliged, he thought, logically, and the hon. gentleman defended his motion on the ground of following out the logic of the proposition, to embrace every other class of criminal proceedings as well as the one particularly referred to in this Bill.

SIR JOHN A. MACDONALD said he would like to say a word or two again on this point, which was one of considerable moment. The hon. the Minister of the Interior had stated that this Bill introduced no new principle. Why, it introduced the principle of allowing the defendant, in cases of assault, to give evidence on his own behalf, which privilege, unless this measure became law, he would not have; therefore, this was an alteration.

MR. MILLS: He does so now, only in another way.

SIR JOHN A. MACDONALD said the defendant did not do it now in any other way. If a man considered he was assaulted he might go and lodge his complaint, but he did not give his testimony as a witness; he made his complaint and, therefore, this was an innovation. The hon. gentleman said that, if his (Sir John A. Macdonald's), amendment was adopted, they must go further and adopt it as to every kind of offence. The hon. gentleman promoting the Bill had limited this principle to matters of assault; and