

the right to express publicly their views but, indeed, to acquire the knowledge and understanding on which such views might be founded. It would be a grave miscalculation were the Soviets to misinterpret the very strength of our democratic system as a demonstration of weakness of our resolve.

It is with considerable conviction, therefore, that I call on the INF negotiators to achieve real progress within the limited time remaining so that in this instance the armaments spiral will not be allowed to proceed a twist (*sic*).

In seeking to arrest the arms race, the problem that continues to preoccupy me is the technological momentum that lies at its root. We must come to grips with that problem, which was the central point of my presentation to this Assembly four years ago. Let me return to it briefly.

I start with the proposition that all new weapons systems are potentially destabilizing. That is because such systems will heighten concerns about a disarming first-strike capability, or will tend to blur the difference between nuclear and conventional warfare, or will increase the problems of verification.

**Suffocation  
strategy**

Instability is the fuel that feeds the nuclear arms race. That is why, four years ago, I put before this Assembly a "strategy of suffocation" designed to deprive the nuclear arms race of the oxygen on which it feeds, from the laboratories to the testing sites.

The main elements of the strategy had long been familiar features of the arms-control dialogue: a comprehensive test ban; a halt to the flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles; a cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and a limitation, and eventual reduction, of military spending for new strategic weapons systems. It was in the combination of these elements that I saw a more coherent, a more efficient and a more promising instrument for curbing the nuclear arms race.

But the strategy was never meant to be applied unilaterally. It always envisaged negotiated agreements between the nuclear powers. All elements of the strategy would probably not fall into place at once. But all were essential if the strategy were to have its full effect: the halt of the technological momentum of the arms race by freezing at the initial or testing stage the development of new weapons systems.

While I continue to believe that such a technological freeze is fundamental to controlling the arms race, I would now propose, however, that it be enfolded into a more general policy of stabilization. I do not consider the strategy of suffocation to be in competition with current negotiations or with negotiations shortly to commence. Indeed, I believe that the more successful these negotiations are, the more likely will they need to be entrenched in agreements along the lines I have proposed.