

shipping brings into question the effectiveness of this "reserve" under conditions prevailing in any future war. A review seems warranted to determine whether the commitment should be changed or whether steps should be taken to substantially increase the "reality" of the reserve components in today's circumstances.

Air Force

The Royal Canadian Air Force has maintained in Europe one air division. Until recently it consisted of 12 air-defence squadrons at four bases. In 1959 the Government of Canada agreed to change the role of the air division from air defence to strike reconnaissance and obtained the concurrence of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to a reduction from 12 squadrons to eight. Each base will now accommodate two squadrons instead of three. This change was agreed to by SACEUR because the new aircraft, the CF104, is a very sophisticated aircraft which requires more technical support than the aircraft it replaces, and because of the demanding nature of the strike role. The strike role is one requiring the ability to drop atomic bombs on enemy military targets in the event of hostilities.

... This brings up the question of NATO nuclear policy. As far back as December 1955, the NATO ministerial meeting demonstrated the clear intention on the part of all member governments to see the Atlantic forces equipped with the most modern weapons. In 1957, the NATO Council stressed the fact that the U.S.S.R. was steadily proceeding with the development of its own nuclear armament. The foreign ministers affirmed the right of the alliance to the possession of modern arms necessary in its defence against aggression.

The heads of government, meeting in December of the same year, publicly confirmed the NATO decision to establish stocks of nuclear weapons which would be readily available for the defence of the alliance in case of need. Again, in February 1959, NATO authorities affirmed that, after the required bilateral agreements had been reached, the United States had delivered nuclear-capable weapons for the nuclear deterrent to NATO forces in Europe and that this transfer was being continued.

The dependence upon nuclear weapons against both strategic and tactical targets has been brought about for two basic reasons - the marked superiority in Soviet manpower vis-à-vis NATO forces in being, and the knowledge that the Soviets have similar weapons in operation. This dependence, however, has not reduced the requirement to increase the conventional capability of the alliance, but NATO authorities have never called for this requirement to be met at the expense of its nuclear capability. Thus, at the ministerial meeting in December of last year it was agreed "that it was necessary to increase the effectiveness of conventional forces", but it was also agreed "that adequate and balanced forces, both nuclear and conventional, were necessary to provide the alliance with the widest