

not accept the request of the President of the United States and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to put an end to the series of tests which it had embarked upon. Furthermore, the four tests made by the United States have been carried out underground and have hence produced no radioactive fall-out.

The representatives of the United States have emphasized several times that their country is ready to sign at once a treaty banning nuclear tests permanently, under effective international control, the treaty which had been elaborated in the negotiations at Geneva and which to be completed requires only agreement on three points. This was explained very clearly to the Committee by the representatives of both the United Kingdom and the United States. But the Soviet Union has not agreed to negotiate a solution to these three points at issue.

What was the essence of the three points of disagreement? Basically they relate to the degree of control and verification which the Soviet Union is willing to accept in order to permit the implementation of a satisfactory treaty to ban tests permanently. The Soviet Union professes to believe that the control measures necessary would be used for spying unless their own citizens were able to exercise a veto over every aspect of the practical functioning of the control system. This morbid apprehension of espionage seems to us very extraordinary in a great nation like the Soviet Union, which undoubtedly possesses such great power. Why is the Soviet Union so reluctant to impose upon itself a few minor limitations on its national sovereignty in the interests of international peace and security? We shall probably have more to say about this important problem during our discussion of item 3 of our agenda, general disarmament.

I would suggest that representatives of the non-aligned or uncommitted nations should examine carefully the unresolved points in the draft treaty for the cessation of nuclear weapons testing. They are clearly set forth in the speeches of the United States and United Kingdom representatives which are in the verbatim reports of the proceedings of this Committee. Furthermore, the proceedings of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests are available in a number of documents. After such study representatives could decide for themselves whether it is likely that the proposed control machinery could be used for espionage and whether this possibility should really prevent completing and putting into effect a treaty on the lines drafted.

I know that representatives here are busy men and that, when the days' meetings and obligatory social engagements are finished, there is not much time or energy left for careful study of the complicated questions with which we are faced, especially in the disarmament sphere. But this is a vital question: what is the dividing line between espionage and the reliable control, inspection and verification of treaty provisions with respect to the cessation of nuclear tests or disarmament? It would be helpful if all those who will speak on this subject would inform themselves as fully as possible as to what the problem of control really is.

Now, what is the position of the Soviet Union in regard to the cessation of nuclear testing? I quote from the letter of 26 September from the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, document A/4893: