

whom sec. 1 applies are "tradesman, artificer, workman, labourer, or other person whatsoever." A barber has been held not to be an "other person" *ejusdem generis* with "tradesman," etc., and so not within the scope of the section: (*Palmer v. Snow*, 82 L.T. Rep. 199; (1900) 1 Q.B. 725). The Customs Consolidation Act 1876 affords, in sec. 43, an illustration of a non-penal enactment as to which it is not yet settled whether the *ejusdem generis* doctrine applies or not. The section runs: "The importation of arms, ammunition, gunpowder, or any other goods may be prohibited by proclamation or Order in Council." Though King's Bench Division in Ireland thought the doctrine did not apply, and that the enactment covered goods of other kinds besides arms, though this was not the actual point raised for decision: (*Hunter v. Coleman*, 1914, 2 I.R. 372). Mr. Justice Sankey has recently decided that the section does not apply to goods other than arms and things *ejusdem generis* with arms, etc. (*Attorney-General v. Brown*, *post*, page 24), so that the English and Irish Courts are at variance on this point. But Mr. Justice Sankey's decision is under appeal, and no more can now be said about it. Whatever the meaning of sec. 43 may eventually be held to be, it is quite certain that the *ejusdem generis* doctrine will play very little part in arriving at that meaning, and that there will be no question of the bald construction of the words of the section apart from a voluminous context and lengthy history.

The Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions) Act 1915 has been mentioned as illustrating the *ejusdem generis* doctrine. The question arose under sec. 1 (3), by which an order for recovery of possession of houses of a certain class cannot be made except on certain specified grounds, "or on some other ground which may be deemed satisfactorily by the Court," and in *Stovin v. Fairbrass* (121 L.T. Rep. 172; (1919) W.N. 216) the Court of Appeal was divided as to the proper construction of the general words "on some other ground," etc. Lords Justices Bankes and Atkins held that the general words must be taken to be limited by the preceeding enumeration of specified grounds on which an order might be made, so that a corresponding limit was thus placed on the discretion of the Court. Lord Justice Scrutton dissented and thought the general words should be construed