

not be arbitrary and uncertain, but assured, and wisely ordered to the making of a good citizen. To this end, it is the best in the life of the nation to which they belong that we have to give to the young. All other languages, literatures, histories are to be regarded as merely contributory to the native elements and the national character.

It is always character indeed that we keep before us, not knowledge. It is an educational truism that it matters not what and how various a man's knowledge may be, if it does not enter into the texture of his mind it may as well be on his book-shelves. Knowledge which is not woven into life and conduct is so far from being wisdom that it is often an enemy of wisdom and an obstructor of wise counsel.

To form the good citizen, remember, we must first form the good man. So thought the ancient Athenian; so thought the Roman, whether he spoke through the mouth of Cato, or Cicero, or Quintilian; so assuredly must think the Christian, for he has to seek first the Kingdom of God. Hence it is that, when the education of the young is not wholly left to casual influences and custom, we are compelled to ask the question, What is a good man? and, How shall we form him? The answer to this question is contained in the science and art of education. Surely, then, a subject worth considering by all, necessary to be considered by those who mean to devote their lives to the task of educating.

I am not, of course, going to deal here and now with the science of education, or even to show what it precisely means. I have to confine myself to one element in all education which, next to ethical training, I consider the chief, because it contributes more than any other to the desired ethical result—viz., Language. And I shall speak of the art of education

alone in this connection—of those methods of procedure which best enable us, as educators, to achieve our self-imposed task. I mean to be strictly practical, leaving it to yourselves, when thinking over what I may say, to connect it with the science which underlies and vindicates the argument.

Of the education of man generally, we may say with the Greeks that our aim is *ἀρετή*, the excellence of the individual after his kind, and that the action of mind in attaining to this excellence is *σωφροσύνη*, if we give it the sense of self-regulation. This self-regulation, which is the wise conduct of life, is dependent on the Will, which, as the dominant characteristic of man, sets in motion (speaking broadly) his intelligence and selects his motives. But this intelligence and this will cannot work in the air, and materials on which they may exercise their formal activity must be provided, and it is these which the instincts of our nature and the experiences of life furnish. The school interposes to formulate, enrich, and elevate these experiences, and supply the principles and aims of life, out of which the fabric of motives may be built. The richest mind, however, may be weak in intelligence and will. It is the power of discriminating and of rightly reasoning, of separating the right from the wrong, the good from the bad, which must always govern.

Now, if this be so, it may plausibly be maintained that, by exercising the intelligence purely as such—as a system of abstract powers, we shall best fit it for coping with the complex materials of experience; that, by disciplining these powers and mental processes which enter into all knowledge and make it possible, we should best fit a human being to regulate his life. And why so? Because these powers and processes of mind are universal and not partial in their ap-