

of humour), and they realize no less clearly that a headlong plunge into the whirlpool of war might at the best prove a very expensive way of achieving their cherished goal. To what extent they entertain any hopes of getting what they want without fighting for it I do not know. But should the Allies prove completely victorious in the end, as I believe they will, it would, particularly on the part of England, be good business, if nothing more, to insist on the belated return of the Danish part of Sleswick to the country of which it forms a natural adjunct.

Because of her position, sheltered by the Koelen mountains on the one side and by the Atlantic on the other, with Sweden acting as a buffer toward Russia and Denmark toward Germany, Norway remains almost unconcerned by the war as long as the two sister nations are unaffected and England does not suddenly desert a policy that has become expressive of one of Norway's main ideals. I do not think much account needs to be taken of any Norwegian fears of England, however much Germany may strive to foster them. But it is always better to meet such fears half-way, and England should not deem it beneath her dignity to do so. More than immediate defeat or victory is at stake just now. A new order of things is likely to emerge from this ordeal of fire. And, when this happens, the nature of the new order may depend in no little degree on the confidence reposed in England by the smaller nations. Such a confidence takes time to develop, though it may disappear in a moment; and it is more determined by public gossip than by the inside knowledge of men in power. Norway's fear of being dragged into the fight by one of the other two Scandinavian countries is much more real and much more significant. But there is a silver