

hear persons contending for the right of sometimes killing, as for the lawfulness of sometimes stealing, or sometimes committing adultery, or sometimes bowing down to graven images. What then is the principle for which we contend? *An unreasoning reliance upon God for defence in all those cases in which we should violate His laws by defending ourselves.* A confidence in God which will induce us to set aside our own views of safety and interest, and simply to obey precepts which appear inexpedient and unsafe. If there be any lesson of morality which it is of importance to mankind to learn, and if there be any which they have not yet learnt, it is the necessity of simply performing the duties of christianity without reference to consequences. Simple obedience without reference to consequences, is our great duty. If we could persuade ourselves to do this, we should certainly pass through life with greater consistency of conduct, and, as we firmly believe, in greater enjoyment and greater peace. And if God does not allow a sparrow to fall to the ground unnoticed, will he not preserve the lives of his servants from the violent hands of assassins, when their preservation will prove conducive to his glory and their good. Let us hear Jesus Christ—“Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell. Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall to the ground without your Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered. Fear ye not therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows.”

Marmion, however, would have the one hundred christians slay the fifty pirates. God says, Thou shalt not kill,—but Marmion thinks it is right to kill such foes. God says, Avenge not yourselves, for vengeance is mine,—but Marmion says, Take vengeance into your own hands. God says, Resist not the evil man, but Marmion says, Resist the murderer unto death. Accordingly, Marmion and his companions level their muskets and send the leaden messengers of death to the hearts of their foes. Or fighting yard-arm and yard-arm they cut with their swords, or plunge with their bayonets, or fire with their pistols, though every stroke, and thrust, and explosion, sends a deathless soul to perdition. The pirates raging with fury sell their lives as dearly as possible, and many of the christians with death-weapons in their grasp, are sent to the judgment-seat of him who hath said, Love your enemies—“For if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? Do not even the publicans the same?” Such a course of retaliation, resistance, and strife, we call, earthly, sensual and devilish. Will Marmion upon serious reflection, call it *christlike*? See the christians in deadly strife with the assassins—see the blood of their foes dripping from their hands! Is that imitating him who was led as a lamb to the slaughter—who gave his back to the smiters—who prayed his father to forgive his murderers—and who suffered for us, leaving an example that we should follow his steps? Is that “committing the keeping of our souls to God in well going, as unto a faithful Creator?” *Christlike*, did we ask? What is there distinctive in the religion of Jesus, if it be not that it teaches us to love our enemies, and do good to them that hate us? And what is there peculiar in the example he and his apostles have left us, if it be not that they never repelled injury by violence, but sought to overcome the evil dispositions of their enemies by forbearance and kindness?

We have referred to this utmost possible extremity, because we are willing to meet objections of whatever nature, and because, by admitting this, which is enforced by all our prejudices and all our instincts, we have shown that we give to Marmion and all who differ from us, a fair, an open, and a candid recognition of all the consequences of our principles. We would however beg the same candour of Marmion, and remind him that the pirate case has little practical reference to war: for if he should think that in this instance we have not supported our principles, he will yet recollect that very few wars are proved to be lawful. It has rarely indeed happened that wars have been undertaken simply for the preservation of life, and that no other alternative has remained to a people, than to kill or be killed. And let it be remembered that *unless this alternative only remains*, the case of the pirates is irrelevant; it applies not, practically, to the subject.

The allusion to piracy by Marmion, we think, was most unfortunate for his cause. A person of his intelligence needs not to be told, that if there were no spirit of war in the community, there would be no pirates nor highway robbers. We have encouraged piracy and robbery on a large scale. We have sent our privateers and public armed vessels for the express purpose of robbery and slaughter. The property of the innocent trader is seized on the high sea; and if he resists, he is shot dead, agreeably to the law of nations in Christendom. When our ships return loaded with plunder and prisoners, they are hailed with joyful acclamations, and the robbers are honoured and applauded. The custom of war has brought these evils of piracy upon us; and shall we use the actual existence of an evil as an argument for the continuance of a custom which has brought it upon us. And piracy can never be abolished so long as war on private property on the ocean is permitted by the law of nations—or so long as privateering is sanctioned by christian governments—or so long as markets are to be found in christendom for the sale of piratical goods. The fact is that piracy derives countenance from the war-system still cherished by christians themselves. “I am a pirate,” said one to Alexander the Great, “because I have only a single vessel. Had I great fleet, I should be a conqueror.”

“One murder made a villain;
Millions a hero. Princes were privileged
To kill, and numbers sanctified the crime.”

We come now to the great objection of Marmion, namely, if the principles of peace were generally adopted, it would destroy civil government. It is a rule of honourable controversy that “the consequences of any doctrine are not to be charged on him who maintains it, unless he expressly avows them.” If an absurd consequence be fairly deducible from any doctrine, it is rightly concluded that the doctrine itself is false; but it is not rightly concluded that he, who advances it, supports the absurd consequence. The charitable presumption, in such a case, would be, that he had never made the deduction; and that, if he had made it, he would have abandoned the original doctrine. Marmion we are glad to say is an honourable disputant,* for while he labours to shew that our principles, carried out to their con-

sequences, involve the destruction of civil government, he admits that this would be “a position too monstrous for our approbation.” As the argument of Marmion is levelled at the reasoning of Dr. Wayland, inserted in No. ii. of the present volume of the Pearl, we may as well mention that Dr. W. in his chapter on benevolence towards the injurious, treats of three cases, and that we introduced but two for the consideration of our readers. His third case we will now present for the notice of Marmion.

“And third, where an individual has committed an injury against society. Such is the case when an offender has violated a law of society, and comes under its condemnation. In what way and on what principles is society bound to treat him? 1. The crime being one which, if permitted, would greatly injure if not destroy society, it is necessary that it be prevented. Society has, therefore, a right to take such measures as will ensure its prevention. This prevention may always be secured by solitary confinement. But this being done, society is under the same obligation to the offender, as the several individuals composing the society are under to him. Hence,—2. They are bound to seek his happiness by reclaiming him; that is, to direct all treatment of him, while under their care, with distinct reference to his moral improvement. This is the law of benevolence, and it is obligatory no less on societies than on individuals. Every one must see that the tendency of a system of prison discipline of this kind must be to diminish crime; while that of any other system must be, and always has been, to increase it. Nor is this chimerical. The whole history of prisons has tended to establish precisely this result. Prisons which have been conducted on the principle of retaliation, have every where multiplied felons; while those which have been conducted on the principle of rendering a prison a school of moral reformation, have, thus far, succeeded beyond even the anticipations of their friends. Such a prison is also the greatest terror to a wicked man; and it ceases not to be so, until he becomes, at least, comparatively virtuous. The whole experience of John Howard is summed up by himself in a single sentence: “It is in vain to punish the wicked, unless you seek to reclaim them.” By this quotation, Marmion will perceive that Dr. Wayland did not conceive that there was any inconsistency in advocating the unlawfulness of all war, and the propriety of civil governments punishing offenders with a view to their reformation. Two or three extracts will suffice to show that the argument of Marmion does not affect the question of the unlawfulness of war.

Erasmus, one of the early Reformers, on this subject holds the following language. “But they [the apologists for war] proceed to argue, that as it is lawful to inflict punishment on an individual delinquent, it must also be lawful to take vengeance on an offending State. The two cases differ widely in this respect. He who is convicted *judicially*, suffers the punishment which the laws impose: but in war, each treats the other side as *guilty*, and proceeds to inflict punishment, regardless of law, judge or jury. In the former case the evil only falls on him who committed the wrong; the benefit of the example redounds to all: in the latter case, the greatest part of the very numerous evils falls on those who deserve no evil at all; on husbandmen, on old people, on members of families, on orphans, and on defenceless young females. But if any good at all can be gathered from a thing which is itself the worst of all things, the whole of that good devolves to the share of a few most profligate robbers, to the mercenary pillager, to the piratical privateer. But if any one should exclaim, “that it would be unjust that he who has offended should not suffer condign punishment;” I answer, that it is much more unjust that so many thousand innocent persons should be called to share the utmost extremity of misfortune, which they could not possibly have deserved. But the objector repeats, “Why may I not go and cut the throats of those who would cut our throats if they could?” Do you then consider it as a disgrace that any should be more wicked than yourself? Why do you not go and rob thieves? they would rob you if they could.”

Our second citation is from the irrefutable work of Jonathan Dymond, entitled “an Inquiry into the accordancy of War with the principles of Christianity; and an Examination of the Philosophical reasoning by which it is Defended.” “Some men talk as if the principles which we maintain were subversive of all order and government. They ask us—Is the civil magistrate to stand still and see lawless violence ravaging the land? Is the whole fabric of human society to be dissolved? We answer, no; and that whencesoever these men may have derived their errors, they are not chargeable upon us or upon our principles. To deduce even a plausible argument in favour of war from the permission “to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil,” it is obviously necessary to show that we are permitted to take his life. And the right to put an offender to death, must be proved, if it can be proved at all, either from an express permission of the christian Scriptures, or supposing Christianity to have given no decisions, either directly or indirectly, from a necessity which *knows no alternative*. Now every one knows that this express permission to inflict death is not to be found; and, upon the question of its necessity, we ask for that evidence which alone can determine it—the evidence of experience; and this evidence, the advocate of war has never brought, and cannot bring. And we shall probably not be contradicted when we say, that that degree of evidence which experience has afforded, is an evidence in our favour rather than against us. What then does the lawfulness of coercion on the part of the magistrate, prove upon the question of the lawfulness of war? If capital punishments had never been inflicted, what would it have proved? Obviously nothing. If capital punishments cannot be shown to be defensible what does it prove? Obviously nothing: for an unauthorized destruction of human life

advocates of anarchy, or of unlimited clemency? When the government of Canada pardoned all the rebels, did we extol the act? Have we written nothing in favour of solitary prison confinement? And have we not opposed capital punishments, because a long trial of ages has proved their total inefficiency to repress crime, and because other modes of punishment are more calculated to uphold the supremacy of the laws? As for talking about “righteous executions,” and executions being sometimes absolutely necessary, we deem them at best to be mere rhetorical flourishes. They may do very well in a poem, but are quite out of place in an argument. A counter assertion is all that is requisite to meet such strong reasons. Let the writer prove that God, under the Christian dispensation, authorises the deliberate slaughter of human beings on the gallows, and we will readily confess our error in all that we have said of the execution of the rebels in Canada. We never asked for their unlimited clemency: all we desired was that their lives might be spared. The taking of human life, the sending of soul and body, deliberately and on set purpose, so far from being accordant with the benevolence of the Gospel, is abhorrent to the feelings of humanity. And we maintain, that the protection of society can be secured as well, and that the other great objects of punishment can be secured better by imprisonment, than by death. In other words,—They are forbidden, and they are useless.

on the gallows, cannot justify another unauthorized destruction of it on the field.”

Another author refers to the subject in the following manner: “The broad, palpable distinction between the system of war and that of civil government is this—“The first cannot exist without the right to kill, the other can. In the former, the right to kill is the very soul, the whole life of the system: in the latter, it is a mere question of expediency. To abolish the entire war-system by enforcing the commandment, “Thou shalt not kill,” leaves, therefore, the whole civil system untouched. Hence it is obvious, that the denial of the lawfulness of war has nothing to do with the question of obedience to the magistrate. It has, indeed, no other effect, than to apply to the authority of the civil magistrate on the question of war, the same rule which governs in the case of capital punishments.” Again: “Because the head of every family in a neighbourhood may and should govern his children, you surely would not infer the right of these families to fight one another under any circumstances whatever; yet from the conceded right of a government to punish and restrain its own subjects, you argue its authority to wage war against other governments. The difference between the two cases, appears to me so plain and broad, that I see not how any logical mind can think of reasoning from one to the other. It is one thing for the head of a family to govern its members, and quite another for that family to fight another family sword in hand.” Once more: “If, on some occasions, the most peaceable are obliged to have recourse to the decision of the law for the redress of a grievance, why could not a council of modern Amphictyons be established in Europe, to settle national disputes? Surely the benign spirit of the Gospel should long ere now have taught Christendom to adopt an institution, of which the pagan wisdom of ancient Greece set them so charming and instructive an example.” Marmion lauds civil governments. And so would we extol a government conducted on christian principles. But if christian justice be the rule and guide of human councils—it can give no sanction to any sort of penal retribution from man, except that which leads to the correction of vice, and to repentance. We have an example of christian jurisprudence in practical operation, in the early history of Pennsylvania; and it appears that the constable’s staff was found to be sufficient, both to command the respect of the people, and to enforce the execution of the criminal laws, without sword or musket.

But Marmion argues in favour of war from civil governments as they now are—we argue against all war from civil governments as they should be. The great fault of civil government has been, that it has acted like an angry vindictive parent; and its punishments have seldom or never reformed a criminal. There is no exercise of love and compassion towards the delinquent, but only of anger and malice. “No one nation,” says the amiable Dr. Bogue, “since the day that Pilate testified of Christ, “I find no fault in this man,” and yet condemned him to death, ever administered a system of government according to christian principles, or pursued a regular succession of political measures, under the spirit of christian benevolence.” But although we allow that physical force may be used to a great extent without violating the law of love, we do not think that it can be carried, in any case, to the extent of depriving a fellow-creature of his life, and sending his soul to a miserable eternity. No circumstances whatever can justify it under the gospel dispensation. So Tertullian classes a participation in capital punishments with the aiding and abetting of idolatry itself. So also Lactantius; “It is unlawful for a righteous man to prosecute any person capitally—since all killing is prohibited. The divine law allows of no exception. It must ever be a forbidden wickedness to put man to death: for God has created him a sacred animal.” But when Marmion objects to our principles of peace as subversive of the power of the magistrate, he shoots at the wrong target; he should change his ground, and accuse us, not of weakening the hands of government, but of arming it with too much power, and leaving subjects entirely at its mercy.

We have now noticed the principal objections urged by our friend Marmion against our views of peace. If we have not removed them all to his satisfaction, we beg him to charge it to our inability to defend the pacific principles of Christ, rather than to the incorrectness of the views we entertain. There may be difficulties on our side of the question: it would be strange if there were not. But has the scheme of Marmion no difficulties to surmount? We verily believe that where we have *one*, he has fifty to remove. The candour of our opponent will induce him to admit that the difficulties are not all on our side. Whether we have succeeded in establishing the position THAT WAR OF EVERY KIND, IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH CHRISTIANITY, it is not our business to determine; but of this, at least, we can assure the reader, that we would not have intruded this inquiry upon the public, if we had not believed, with undoubting confidence, that the position is accordant with everlasting truth;—with that truth which should regulate our conduct here, and which will not be superseded in the world that is to come.

THE EDITOR,

[We had marked passages in Marmion’s article, to each of which we intended to have given a distinct reply. But as we have replied in general to every thing of importance, we think it best to leave the minor points. If our general positions are defensible, a thousand objections will not destroy their force. The case of the *Algerines* we should have noticed but for this reason—we do not know whether Marmion believes that it is right “to do evil, that good may come”—and that it is right for slaves to destroy their masters in order to gain their freedom. At the very time that the French were slaughtering the *Algerines* for holding in captivity the subjects of France, the French were themselves guilty of the same diabolical crime in respect to the negroes in their colonies. Would it be right for an African army (supposing it possible) to uproot the French nation for enslaving Africans? And it should not be overlooked that Algiers was not taken but with an immense sacrifice of human life—and still the climate is multiplying its victims. The nations of Europe look with a jealous eye at the possession of Algiers by France, England more especially, and perhaps at no distant day, the conduct of France towards Algiers may involve Europe in a bloody and expensive war. On the subject of the proper time to declare the commands of Almighty God in reference to peace, we may yet see occasion to vindicate the propriety of our conduct. According to the temporizing policy of the world—according to the pernicious maxims of the times, we were wrong—but not according to the unbending, uncompromising tenets of the Gospel of God. A matter of policy and a dictate of duty and conscience, are two entirely different things.]

* We wish that another writer who has controverted our views in a public journal, had acted as honourably as Marmion. But no; instead of this, he has read us a lecture on the superlative excellence of law—and on the strange perversion of the idea of mercy that could prompt our government to extend unlimited clemency to wolfish bands of blood; while the sighs of the widow and cries of the orphan were unregarded; and have we been the