

What warrant have we for believing that during the next fifty years their actions and temper will be materially different from their conduct during the past fifty years? We can only say that such a treaty, if rightly used, contains the germs of international friendship and goodwill, but it may also be the club for a powerful and aggressive nation to use unsparingly upon a weaker one. The method of concurrent legislation appears to be more free from the difficulties just mentioned. Each country is free to legislate along certain lines, with a proviso that it take effect upon the other country enacting similar legislation. Neither country is tied up to any hard and fast agreement. If the legislation is repealed in one country it is automatically repealed in the other. It leaves Canada entirely free to adjust her relations with the Empire. It gives her absolute control of her own tariff matters, and prevents her becoming a suppliant at the feet of an aggressive and powerful neighbour. On the other hand, it permits the Republic to maintain its traditional and historic policy by refraining from entangling alliances. If she chooses to continue a policy of commercial conciliation towards Canada, well and good; if she does not, Canadians have no ground of complaint. They have the undoubted privilege of creating a reciprocity of tariffs instead of a reciprocity of trade. The method of maximum and minimum tariffs might also be employed. It has many desirable features, chief among which is the more equal treatment which it is likely to accord to all nations. All these methods, however, must be governed by the facts and circumstances in existence when the time for negotiation comes. No hard and fast method should be laid down, and unless a proper spirit emanates from both peoples, reciprocal trade will never be achieved this side of the Greek Kalends.

Considering then the general trend of public opinion in the United States,

it is pretty clear that if enlarged commercial intercourse with Canada is ever attained, the subject must be approached more or less indirectly. In other words, it is exceedingly doubtful if the mere narrow issue of reciprocity is sufficient to attract the attention of the great body of American people. If their convictions are once firmly fixed upon the necessity for general tariff revision, then the movement for reciprocal trade with Canada is likely to succeed. In the first place, a general reduction of tariff duties by the Republic would place her on more friendly and intimate commercial terms with Great Britain, and as well as other portions of the Empire. In the second place, her tariff would then tend to an equality with that of Canada. A more reasonable basis for negotiation would exist, and to some extent, the present preferential policy of Canada might be applied to the Republic. Any loss which Great Britain might suffer from the extension of the Canadian preference to the United States would be fully recouped by her increased exports to the Republic. But the two things must go together. No further commercial privileges can be granted by Canada to the United States until the latter has evinced a genuine disposition to reciprocate. That friendly relations between two such countries are eminently desirable no one will dispute. A good deal of sentimental nonsense, however, is wasted on this subject. Most of the banquet talk and high-sounding encomiums mean very little when it comes to international business. The best evidence of a nation's friendship is to be found in deeds, not words. If those deeds are tainted by sharp-practice and shifty standards of righteousness, they betoken a very doubtful amity. If, on the other hand, they embody the principles of equity and fair-dealing, their inspiration has arisen from a spirit of Christian friendship, which is the highest test of a nation's greatness.