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and on the rsburgh on e day the nnouncing Principa-" material key to his sian army ossed the avia, thus ns without id not go Pasha, the though he to 120,000 eight days, set herself

right with that power. During this period of Britain's hesitation, Russia, having command of the Black Sea, perpetrated the dastardly and murderous nassacre of Sinope, and occupied the Principalities the banks of the Danube, the mouths of which he obstructed. Nearly a year passed between her irst aggressive movement, before Britain declared war, which declaration was formally made so late s the 28th of March, 1854, little more than a year go. And after this declaration how slow and orbearing were her movements. The allies may be aid to have rendered no effectual assistance in he stupendous achievement of worsting the Rusians in every battle, and, finally of driving them, ingle handed, out of the Principalities. Though dispatched in the Spring, their troops did not engage the enemy till Autumn. And what generosity and forbearance marked their course, after hostilities commenced. Although they destroyed the batteries, magazines, and vessels, in the harbour of Odessa, they studiously spared the town. In view of all these facts, could England have shown more aversion to war? Could she have resorted to any more pacific expedients than those to which she did resort, before she drew the sword? And what, I would ask, would have been the effect on the freedom of Europe, on its civilization and religious improvement, had the allies—had ENGLAND tood passively by, and suffered an absolute, semibarberous, and grossly superstitious, fanatical, and intolerant power to work out her schemes of con-