

minister ; in fact, his responsibility would be as much increased as his power to discharge his duties would be, by the existence of the board. At present, he has only to make himself acceptable to Parliament ; and this is to be done by the general policy of the cabinet, rather than by his own colonial measures. He would *then* have to manage his colonial advisers also, who would look directly to the colonies and judge of him by his own doings. Their disapproval of his measures would be very apt to make Parliament look much more closely into the matter, than under the old system they have ever done. By giving the delegates a right to bring up colonial questions in Parliament, or to speak upon them when before either House, this end would be fully attained.

There are many other incidental advantages of such a system, upon which we have not space at present to enlarge. In the selection of colonial governors, it would ensure a much more careful and thorough scrutiny into their qualifications than is at present possible. In giving them their instructions, in judging of their measures and recommendations,—in every act, in short, of the department, it would be of essential service to the minister. It would keep the attention of Parliament and of the nation more steadily directed to the colonies, and would ensure us no small benefit thereby. Commercial legislation and treaties would be better looked to, in connection with our interests. The statesmen of the mother country would be made more intimately conversant with our wants ; and our own leading public men would be made better acquainted with *their* views, and would be introduced, not merely to a wider field for their own personal ambition, but to one on which they could better serve the colony of their birth or adoption, and the empire at large. The colonial policy of the empire might further be expected to become, under the influence of such a system, *progressive*, as it must, if it is to keep pace with the exigencies of the times. As the