

*Supply—External Affairs*

The third subject I dealt with last January is one which will occupy our attention and at times our anxieties, namely, the relations between the Soviet union and the coalition of free states in which Canada is playing a part. In so far as the possibility of an all-out war is concerned, I think it can be said, as it has been said on more than one occasion, that we are now reaching, if we have not already reached, a deadlock of mutual deterrence through the certainty of mutual destruction. That is in a sense, I suppose, effective but it does mean reliance by both sides on the fear brought about by thermonuclear power used for destructive purposes. Therefore national security and international peace are becoming merely the probability and the hope that we will get through any year without being blown to bits.

At the very same time that we rely on this deterrence, and we have to rely on it, there is a frantic search going on on both sides for the intercontinental ballistic missile which will remove or certainly will minimize this mutual deterrence by the discovery of an annihilating weapon against which, if used aggressively, there may be no defence or, indeed, no warning. Therefore I do not think any of us can get very much permanent comfort out of a security resting on a balance of terror. Indeed, in that situation there are certain advantages possessed by the Soviet union. With its despotic government, without the restraints of public opinion, it can, if it so desires, use this situation for political blackmail in peacetime and for what have been called brush fire wars which would throw on our side the responsibility of converting these limited wars into thermonuclear ones.

That possible situation certainly has a bearing both on our defence and on our diplomatic policies and it leads me to the conclusion that atomic defence and atomic deterrence are not enough. It also leads me to stress the importance of diplomatic defences, of political unity on our side, of economic strength, of moral purpose. These things are becoming more and more important as developments occur, but while we seek them on our side the drive to extend Soviet influence by a wide variety of means still continues.

The emphasis now in tactics and perhaps in policy has been shifted, I think, since the new leadership came into power in Moscow from the military to the economic and the political. How much this shift represents a change of heart and how much is a revision of thinking forced upon Moscow by the H-bomb and the strength and unity of NATO, I am not prepared to say. I think that the latter factor, our strength, may have been

if not the dominating at least a very important consideration in any changes that have taken place.

But whatever the reason, the Soviet union may now have decided to abandon for the time being at least the open and direct use of armed force for the extension of its influence lest this should lead to the outbreak of global and thermonuclear war. Yet while such a thermonuclear war is recognized by the Soviet union, as it is by us, as a calamity of unthinkable proportions, nevertheless until such time as a condition of greater mutual trust has been established between the two worlds any weakening in the defensive capabilities of the free democracies might provide a serious temptation to the Soviet union to revert to the use of armed force for the pursuit of policy. They certainly have the capacity for this. Their tactics may have changed but their military strength has been maintained. Indeed, their industrial strength has been greatly increased and that industrial and economic strength is now becoming an important agent of their foreign policy. The armed strength of the Soviet union, which is now in process of being revamped and modernized, is a central fact which I suggest we cannot and must not ignore, especially when we consider our own defence plans and defence policies.

Mr. Khrushchev, speaking at the recent 20th party congress in Moscow, said:

We must resolve to take all measures necessary to strengthen further the defence potential of our socialist state.

It is well to remember this when we read of Soviet proposals to demobilize soldiers and when we receive appeals to take it easy and to throw away our arms because the danger has now disappeared. This strengthening, moreover, applies not merely to the Soviet state itself but to what the Soviet leaders call—and they never seem to weary of referring to it—the international camp of socialism, something which, of course, is quite peaceful and respectable although our own coalitions are always referred to by them as aggressive military blocs.

Therefore I think that all members will agree with me that we in the western world must remain on guard. But while all this is true, and it certainly is true, I think it is also true that since the death of Stalin the Soviet government and the Soviet regime have begun to eliminate some of the more objectionable features of both their foreign and domestic policies. There have been relaxations at home, and as a result I believe that certain internal pressures may be developing in Russia which could have a restraining influence on the activities of the Soviet leaders. These Russian leaders may have started