

to come to Canada, with a priority for those who were financially sponsored by friends or relations in Canada and for agricultural and mine workers. They would also have to satisfy the usual health requirements for immigrants.

An explanatory memorandum had been circulated.

(Joint memorandum, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Secretary of State for External Affairs, undated — Cab. Doc. 61 57)†

31. *Mr. Pickersgill* said there were two other immigration problems on which he would like the views of Cabinet. One had to do with Hungarian refugees in Italy and the other with persons of the Jewish faith in Poland who wished to emigrate to Canada.

There were some 4,000 Hungarian refugees now camped in various summer resorts in Northern Italy and the owners wanted the places vacated. The government of Italy was prepared to pay the passage to Canada of 1,500 persons on a selective basis. The proposal would be similar to an ordinary immigration movement and would be advantageous to Canada in increasing the number of Hungarians here who had been picked in accordance with the regular immigration criteria. The same selection team could be used for both the 1,000 refugees in Yugoslavia and the 1,500 in Italy. It would not involve any persons arriving before May or June, and he would propose to make no announcement about it.

In the case of the Polish Jews, strong representations had been made to him to take in more of them by increasing the admissible classes. It appeared that it was now the deliberate policy of the Polish government to allow any Jews to leave who could. He had said he could not consider doing anything for Jews alone, but thought it might be possible to extend the permissible categories to include brothers or sisters of Canadian citizens if they were satisfactorily sponsored financially and were recommended by the Canadian Polish Congress, the Canadian Jewish Congress or the Ukrainian-Canadian Committee, all of whom were strongly anti-communist. These persons would pay their own passage and there would be less than 500 altogether. He would propose to make no announcement.

32. *During the discussion* the following points emerged:

(a) The admission of Hungarian refugees from Yugoslavia would actually make little difference to the numbers entering Canada, as there was only so much transport available. The refugee problem in Austria was being substantially eased and it was understood that the United States were taking some 200 a day without any publicity or controversy, though this seemed to be of doubtful legality.

(b) It might be difficult to justify taking Hungarian refugees from Yugoslavia when Yugoslavs themselves were not able to get into Canada. Against this, it was pointed out that there was no reason why bona fide Yugoslav emigrants could not come in; the difficulty was that exit permits were made available generally only to communists. Canada did take Yugoslavs under 18 and over 60 where there were immediate Canadian relatives, and the main problem was with nephews and nieces.

(c) The admission of Hungarian refugees into Canada was working out far better than had been expected. There had been some concern expressed in labour circles and there had been a few troublemakers among the immigrants.

(d) Austria had indicated quietly that, if there proved to be some troublemakers among the Hungarian refugees from Austria they could be returned to Hungary via that country.

(d) There had always been anti-Jewish feeling in Poland and the government there appeared to be trying to overcome this by getting rid of as many as possible of the Jewish population. Some 100,000 were going to Israel. There seemed to be real fear in the minds of the government of an anti-Jewish pogrom.