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ASIAN COMMUNISM

orchestra is trying to play a symphony. The real disgrace would come, I suppose, if we threw away our fiddle in the middle of a well-conducted performance or deliberately played some discordant notes when the score didn't call for them.

"Abandoning this somewhat tricky musical metaphor, I would add that we should also remember that smaller countries are not necessarily wiser or more righteous than the big and powerful ones. They only seem so because of the limited and relatively unimportant consequences that usually flow from their mistakes or wrong doing.

"There is, however, no refuge of this kind for the United States. That is another penalty of power. One mistake - political, or economic, or strategic - by the colossus and the rest of us may be dangerously, and even fatally affected. You must not therefore be surprised or disturbed when the relief and admiration with which we view your great strength is at times tinged with a shade of anxiety.

"Reducing these abstractions to more concrete terms, I would say that this anxiety today expresses itself most noticeably in economic and in Far Eastern developments. It is here that are to be found the most serious threats to close co-operation within the Atlantic and free world coalition.

INCOMPATIBLE

"As to the first, I can only say - though I would like to say a lot more - that political co-operation and economic conflict are incompatible.

"On the second difficulty, however, I would elaborate a little.

"New forces have swept across the Far East since World War II. Some of these reflect the pulsations of the international communist conspiracy. Others are primarily related to the awakening urge of millions of Asians for national freedom and a better life. If we of the West are not able to agree on the distinction between these two forces which require a different approach and understanding by us, our co-operation in this part of the world may weaken and disappear to the joy and relief of those forces centred in Moscow and Peiping who are using foul means and fair to bring about just such a result.

"This is an actual - and not an imaginary danger - because there is a real difference of view within our coalition as to the meaning of these Asian developments and on what our reaction to them should be. This difference involves, in fact, basic questions of Asian policy.

"There is no dispute over the necessity of resisting communist military aggression, so determined by the United Nations - or even - in certain circumstances - without such formal determination. There will, of course, inevitably be differences over the means for

defeating such aggression and as to the relative contributions of those taking part in the operation. Korea is an example of this kind of difference which can be disagreeable without being fatal.

"A far more serious dispute may arise, however, - there are signs that it has already arisen - over the nature and extent of our collective obligations, if any, to defeat Communism, as such, in Asia.

"There are some who believe that Asian Communism is an implacable foe, bound hand and foot to Moscow, and that to negotiate with it in any circumstances is futile and perilous. Therefore, they argue we must all do everything we can through governmental action short of all-out-war - but even at some risk of war - to prevent the appearance of Asian communist governments; and to weaken and destroy them if they have managed to obtain power. This may require the active encouragement of and support for anti-communist elements in communist countries, and by continuing and strong support for any regime which is opposed to communism, irrespective of its nature or its popular support.

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"There are others, however, individuals, groups and governments, who will have none of this policy. They feel that Communism in Asia, though it may be far deeper and more sinister than 'agrarian reform', is a social, economic and political development, growing out of special Asian conditions and one primarily for Asians to deal with; that the only justification for direct Western intervention is when Communism expresses itself in military aggression. It is felt that our obligation in this matter is positive, not negative; not to intervene against Asian Communism, an intervention which would be stigmatised in Asia as Western and colonial, but to help democratic Asian governments build up free and stable institutions which will defeat Communism by doing more for the welfare of the underprivileged and under-nourished millions of the East than Communism can ever hope to do. We should also, according to this view, not expect Asian governments or Asian people automatically to accept our western views of the cold war and the Kremlin conspiracy.

"Those are the two viewpoints, each of which has its advocates within our Western coalition. I admit that the latter may not always take sufficient account of the aggressive nature of Communism or of the efforts that are being made by the United States to build up a security system in the Pacific. But I also believe - and firmly - that there can be no effective or successful collective action or policy on the basis of the first concept. I believe this because such a policy would have to be worked out and agreed on at the United Nations or in the North Atlantic Alliance, and, frankly, I can see no possibility of such agreement.