

- Establish a Canberra-style commission on "Cooperative Security in Space" and involve Russia and China.
- Engage scientists and technicians worldwide in a discussion on how to construct and elaborate a multilateral ballistic missile control regime
- Discuss with China the potential for cooperation on a multilateral measures
- Look for ways for Canada to reassure Russia indirectly in Track Two-style assistance on unrelated but important issues of Russian concern, such as disease control and circumpolar affairs
- Encourage the US, EU and other countries to provide reassurance directly and indirectly, especially addressing Russia's grave economic position
- Encourage the United States to develop an early-warning ballistic missile system based on ground radar, rather than NMD
- Engage experts, civil society and officials in other NATO countries for the purpose of elaborating, examining, and encouraging informed public discourse on, the full range of relevant NMD issues, notably:
  - missile threat perception and risk analysis,
  - the technical challenges intrinsic to, and the true capabilities of, the currently proposed NMD option,
  - arms control implications of the NMD option, and
  - the elaboration of diplomatic, political and economic policy options or alternatives available for responding to the threat.
- Political engagement, in the company of other like-minded NATO states, with the "threat" states (including Russia, China, and North Korea):
  - to canvass Russia and China for their views on what may be required to develop a cooperative, rules-based approach to managing and reducing ballistic missile threats emerging from non-traditional sources (with a view to introducing those views more prominently into the debate that is slowly developing, or should be, within NATO),
  - to engage N. Korea, and other states with ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction interests and ambitions, to better understand their own security needs/interests and to explore alternative means of pursuing legitimate security needs (the point being to "de-rogue" relations with such states);

Existing support for US-Russian **joint missile early warning**, and for **multilateral approaches to missile warning, surveillance and deployment regulations**, offers a context in which to pursue the management of the missile threat through the development of a multilateral regulatory regime and thus Canada should:

- convene an experts panel to undertake a thorough and **systematic exploration of the possibilities and requirements for the development of multilateral arrangements<sup>1</sup>** for:
  - ballistic missile warning,
  - ballistic missile launch notification,
  - surveillance and monitoring of the pre-launch status of ballistic missiles,