

the American Open Skies initiative of 1955, discussions such as the Geneva Surprise Attack Conference of 1958, and a number of bilateral agreements primarily directed toward crisis management, but which contained large elements that could be considered as confidence-building. Examples include the series of agreements in 1963, 1971 and 1984 to establish "hot line" communications between heads of state in Washington and Moscow, to be used in the event of accidents or crises, the Accidents Measures Agreement of 1971, to facilitate rapid exchange of information in the event of a nuclear accident, the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, which promised consultation if circumstances arose in which there was a risk of nuclear war, the establishment in 1987 of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres for the exchange of notifications and information, and the agreement on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, signed in 1988. A similar bilateral measure, not related to nuclear weapons, was the agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas. Signed in 1972, this accord sought to reduce aggressive behaviour during peacetime naval exercises.

The history of the bilateral negotiations on strategic arms control was very dependent on the capabilities of NTM to be able to verify the deployments of the weapons and to monitor tests. By the time that SALT I was signed in 1972, both sides were able to detect and count ICBM silos, strategic submarines, and heavy bomber aircraft using NTM employing sensors in orbiting satellites. They could also follow the flights and collect the telemetry during the tests of ballistic missiles. Consequently, when the SALT agreements checked the numerical increase in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, adequate verification could be provided by NTM.

This mutual dependence on NTM brought about a first step towards co-operation in 1972, when the SALT I treaty included an agreement

to abstain from deliberate concealment or other interference with NTM.

A radical change came with the INF Treaty of 1987 and START in 1991. By then many of the land-based missiles were mobile rather than being based in large and easily identifiable silos, and since the numbers were to be drastically reduced (in the case of INF, to zero) it would be necessary to verify the destruction of the surplus weapons and to demonstrate that replacements were not being manufactured. NTM would no longer suffice for verification, and it became necessary to introduce extensive data exchanges and intrusive on-site inspections. A high degree of co-operation was required, and many of the new measures could be categorized as the introduction of CBMs.

Apart from the bilateral CBMs arranged by the United States and the Soviet Union, there have been a few between pairs of countries with a long history of rivalries generating competitive arms build-ups. The case of India and Pakistan has been mentioned earlier, in which wars led to the establishment of UN observer missions in 1949 and 1965, but confidence-building measures were introduced in 1990.

Another example is offered by Brazil and Argentina. These two states, the largest in South America, have had a long history of rivalry in armaments. Both signed the Latin American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty in 1967, but did not proceed to full implementation. In 1991 they concluded a bilateral nuclear inspection agreement, undertook not to develop peaceful nuclear explosives, and strengthened domestic controls on the export of nuclear material and missiles. These developments provide a good illustration of the converging roles of non-proliferation and CBMs.

Another bilateral CBM agreement was negotiated in 1991 between Hungary and Romania, for mutual aerial reconnaissance, with no limitation on the quality of the photography, and independent of the Open Skies Treaty.

