

somewhat).

One is the US-Soviet agreement, announced on May 4, 1987, and signed in September, to institute crisis control centres to avoid unintended (accidental) nuclear war. The centres, which will be in Washington and Moscow, will exchange information on matters such as an accidental missile launch or a commercial nuclear accident, like the Chernobyl reactor fire, that might be misinterpreted. The centres will act as "high-tech supplements" to the Washington-Moscow hotline. Such centres will obviously be of great benefit to both superpowers (as well as the rest of the world), and therefore no conflict of interest needed to be resolved in concluding the agreement. However, it still awaits ratification. Another reservation is that the crisis control centres will still be manned by US personnel in the US and Soviet personnel in the USSR (though in close communication with each other), instead of using the mixed teams in both countries that have been recommended by experts. (See Babst et al., 1984, 1986.)

The second example is even more recent: The Agreement on Intermediate and Shorter Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe, which are to be entirely removed (the "double zero" option) by both US and USSR. This agreement was announced at the superpower summit on December 8, 1987, though the details were negotiated beforehand.

The treaty, which covers nuclear missiles with a range of 500-5,500 kilometres, will require the USSR to destroy 1,836 such missiles and the US to destroy 867, within a period of 3 years. Verification will be by on-site inspection, inspection by challenge, and inspection by satellites. The inclusion of on-site and challenge inspection is a breakthrough in arms control negotiations.