



Statement of May 11, 1984, on CSBM Proposals and Non-Use of Force

"As this second session of our Conference begins, it is time to get down to concrete work. I doubt that any Delegation here would disagree. But how to do it?

Briefly, let me restate the objectives of this Conference as seen by my Government — and indeed, we hope, by all other participants. We are trying to adopt confidence- and security-building measures whereby States can demonstrate that their routine, military activities need not be interpreted by other States as being potentially hostile. This demands that a new and wider degree of openness be imparted to military affairs in order to make them more predictable.

Another way of expressing these notions, in a nutshell, is to say that we must develop concrete measures which will give effect and expression to the principle of the non-use of force. What changes in military affairs could make this pledge credible? A reply to this question should be based on an examination of the proposals on the table before us. This is the first step in getting down to concrete work.

Since SC.1* was first on the table, let us look at it first. The measures it contains would enhance trust and security in the following ways:

1. Exchanges of information about military forces would provide a common framework for the other measures and for understanding the significance of the activities of particular units.
2. An annual review of military activities would create a pattern of normal, non-aggressive military behaviour.
3. The advance notice of important military activities in the zone of application would make them more predictable, thus reducing the possibility of misinterpreting the intentions behind such activities by clarifying whether they are routine or possibly threatening.

4. Observation of military activities could confirm that they were routine and unthreatening but, if necessary, they could also defuse tensions at critical moments or warn that something threatening might be going on.

5. Measures of compliance and verification would involve the usual requirement not to interfere in National Technical Means and a requirement for monitoring compliance.

6. Communications between the participating States concerning the regime of CSBMs could be enhanced through appropriate arrangements.

These CSBMs will not transform East-West relations overnight. But they are practical and realistic steps to increase confidence that military forces in peacetime are intended only for defence and not attack. They would be concrete and solid contributions to security and stability. Even if they would not immediately modify the serious imbalance of conventional forces in Europe today, they would at least make this imbalance less menacing in the perception of the participating States.

What about SC.2?*** Notably, it emphasizes that the measures we adopt here should conform to the criteria in the mandate of the Conference; and it envisages building on the experience gained in implementing the confidence-building measures in the Final Act.

The 12 measures in SC.3*** are also in line with the mandate of the Conference, aiming, in part, at making military activities in Europe more predictable. It too envisages building on the experience of implementing the measures in the Final Act. Although it does not specify parameters, SC.3 — and, by the way, SC.2 as well — envisages an approach primarily based on organizational levels rather than simply counting the number of troops. This is of course

significant for the process of verification and, remarkably, all of the 12 measures would require adequate forms of verification.

Now we come to SC.4 tabled by the Soviet Union a few days ago. It is a disappointment. In deploring what are adduced as attempts to upset the existing military and strategic balance, the proposal calls for, and I quote, '...a radical turn in the policies of States' But the suggestions it then puts forward are radical only because most of them do not belong here.

This Conference, grouping together nuclear and non-nuclear participating States, is not an appropriate forum in which to discuss nuclear issues. They are global and the complexity of trying to discuss them here would soon render this negotiation sterile. The zone of application of CSBMs can in no way relate to nuclear arms because many of those situated outside Europe could also strike the continent. The Atlantic to the Urals can only be considered as constituting limits in terms of surprise attack or the use of force for political intimidation by conventional troops.

Proposals to create nuclear-free zones in various parts of Europe also violate the principle of an integral zone of application of CSBMs and would result in some kind of division of Europe, 'partitioned' arbitrarily into some form of sub-zones. They would not increase security because the zones would still be under threat from outside. A zone in Europe free from battlefield nuclear weapons, many of which are fitted for dual-capable delivery systems, involves complicated questions of verification and would require procedures for on-site inspection which are unlikely to be agreed upon. The kind of redistribution of weapons envisaged in this suggestion would not be a real substitute for reduction of them.

The issue of chemical weapons is best left in the hands of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where the

**proposal by Romania

***initial NNA proposal

*NATO proposal