

a manner left without any *Ally*; engaged by the Treaty of *Hanover* to assist the *other contracting Parties*, in case They had been attack'd; but not intitled to their Assistance, when her own Possessions were attack'd; because she stood charg'd with being the *Aggressor*.— How this Step was understood by *Spain*, appears from the *Marquis de Pozzobuono's* * Letter to the Duke of *Newcastle*, the 1st of *January*, 1726-7; and surely, it could never be imagin'd that any other Interpretation could be given to such a Measure!

The *Considerer* having laid it down as an Axiom, which *must be allow'd by all*, and supported by *undoubted Evidences in Facts*, as He speaks in another Place, that the Treaty of *Vienna* made *Counter-Alliances* necessary on our Part, proceeds to shew that an Alliance with *France* was the most proper Alliance in this Case.

He allows, indeed, that *an Alliance with Holland, whose Interests in most Respects is inseparable from That of England, was certainly the most natural and obvious on this Occasion*; but, it seems, the Constitution of that Republick makes it almost impossible to keep a *Negotiation* secret there. — Now, I cannot see any Reason why a *Negotiation* may not be kept as secret there as in any other Court. I confess, indeed, that when a *Negotiation* is form'd into a *Treaty*, it cannot be kept secret; because it must be brought before the *States* for their Consent; and I should be glad to know what good Purpose it can serve to keep any *Treaty* secret, after it is once concluded. I am sure, such *clandestine Treaties* have serv'd many a *bad Purpose* in our own Memory.

* See *Rouss.'s Collection*, Tom 2^d f. 363.