considered. An owner of an estate tail, as we all know, except in certain exceptional cases, has as complete dominion over his estate as an owner in fee simple, and by the execution of a formal deed he may, in most cases, at any time effectually convert his estate in fee tail into a fee simple. An owner of such an estate may contract a large amount of debts on the faith of his having this estate, for creditors are not usually very particular in inquiring the precise technical interest their debtor may have in property, of which, to all outward appearances, he is the absolute owner. Such a man dies without barring the entail, and the result is that the property devolves on the heir in tail, and the creditors have no right to follow it. That, we do not think, is a very satisfactory state of affairs; it appears to be simply a device sanctioned by law for enabling a man to obtain credit by false appearances, and then to withhold his property from liability to the claims of his creditors.

CONTEMPT OF COURT IN CANADA.

THE decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of *Queen* v. *Howland* (reported in 11 O.R. 633, and in 14 A.R. 184), or rather the written reasons of the judges, copies of which are now before us, places the law of contempt of court upon a very clear, and we venture to think, very satisfactory footing.

The facts of the case were very simple. The editor of this journal acted as solicitor for Mr. Howland in some *quo warranto* proceedings which were taken against him after his first election as Mayor of Toronto, in 1886. He had also acted as chairman of Mr. Howland's committee during the mayoralty contest. On March 23rd, 1886, Mr. Dalton, Master in Chambers, gave judgment declaring Mr. Howland not to possess the requisite property qualification. On March 24th an article appeared in the *Mail*, expressing the view that Mr. Howland had made a bad blunder in running for Mayor when not properly qualified. On March 26th Mr. O'Brien gave notice of appeal from Mr. Dalton's decision, and also wrote the letter to the *Mail* newspaper, which was published in that paper on the 27th, and was the *fons et origo mali* in these contempt proceedings. On March 29th Mr. O'Brien, as solicitor for Mr. Howland, wrote a letter to the solicitors of the relator, notifying them that it was Mr. Howland's intention to abandon the appeal, and on the same day he served upon them a formal notice of abandonment. Upon the same day, also, and after receiving this letter and notice, the relator served a notice of motion to commit Mr. O'Brien for contempt of court in writing and causing to be published the letter to the *Mail while the proceedings were still pending*.

Now, seeing that the appeal had been formally abandoned before the notice was served, it has always appeared to us that, apart altogether from the contents of the letter in question, this was a most impudent attempt on the part of the relator to justify his motion after abandonment of the *quo warranto* proceedings, and constitute himself the champion of the Court under circumstances in which he was no more interested than any other person, and as though the Court was not abundantly able to protect its own dignity without the assistance of his