Those are the words of the senator, who has a long experience in this field.

Here therefore is another example of a limitation that justice cannot tolerate unless you want to make of this very justice a matter where money, blackmail and influence rule.

Mr. Speaker, we cannot but agree with the amendment proposed by Bill No. S-3.

In order not to take up too much time, I shall limit myself to making comments on two clauses. As for the others, they too are excellent, especially the one that extends the present law to all financial institutions, and not merely to the banks. We all know how our economic situation has evolved. We trust that it will be recognized that the same goes for our monetary situation and that Creditiste measures will be taken. Here again, we could dwell at length on the matter, Mr. Speaker, and prove that the section to be amended constituted a limitation to the application of justice and its processes. Indeed, I wish to congratulate the honourable minister and the mover of the bill, introduced in the Senate, for their praiseworthy and necsesary initiative. I wish to remind them, before bringing my remarks to a close, that we wish to be assured that, in the near future, the whole Canada Evidence Act will be revised—not only parts of it—to insure better administration of justice.

Mr. Speaker, there is another matter, which is related to this one and could even be included in it, which intrigues me a good deal and to which I should like to draw the attention of the house for a minute or so.

I had a question put on the order paper asking the Department of Justice whether it intended to proceed with judiciary "decentralization" with a view to bringing the justiciable closer to the court; I was told in reply that the government was in the process of studying several ways and means which might be adopted with a view to decentralizing further the activities of the Exchequer Court of Canada.

I should like to ask the honourable minister to give us more details on that matter of decentralization of the judiciary administration. I feel that that reply was rather vague and, for that reason, unacceptable. I know he can give us more information on the ways and means through which the Canadian judiciary system could be decentralized. I believe that not only the Canadian Bar Association but all those interested in the administration of justice would be grateful to the minister if he was to give us more details with regard to that matter since, at present time—we can come back to this later—the Supreme Court is truly an untouchable body.

Mr. Speaker, I bring my remarks to a close by congratulating the mover; I trust the bill will be adopted after having been studied seriously by the committee.

• (4:40 p.m.)

[*English*]

Mr. G. W. Baldwin (Peace River): Mr. Speaker, may I make a few comments and ask the minister a question? I do not know whether it is his intention to close the debate. Our position has been adequately put by the hon. and learned member for Calgary North (Mr. Woolliams), the hon. and learned member for Broadview (Mr. Gilbert) and the hon. and learned member for Lotbinière (Mr. Fortin).

Mr. McCleave: Learning goes a long way.

Mr. Baldwin: Yes, both here and in London. I would like to think that when we are dealing with questions relating to evidence and the Evidence Act the whole picture will be reviewed. I am sure the minister will recall when, as a law student, he was directed to study "The Art of Cross-examination" by Wrottsley, and later went into the police courts from time to time and saw there the application of the great principles of justice where 95 per cent of the people of Canada meet the criminal law at first instance. I think he will have observed that through the courts and the judges, the magistrates, the judges of the county courts and the judges of the Supreme Court, there are fashioned on the anvil of experience the instruments which we must have and preserve for our system of jurisprudence to ensure that the rights of the citizen come first.

Two of these proposals, one under clause 2 and the other under clause 4, have the effect, I think, either of nullifying or of departing from the rules of practice with relation to evidence which have been incorporated in this country by the application of the British common law and have been the subject of judicial declaration. Merely because they were sound a hundred years ago does not necessarily mean they are sound today. However, it is my experience, after some 40 years in and out of the criminal courts, that a person occupying a judicial position has a better opportunity than anyone else of determining the factors which must be brought to