

Supply—National Defence

show anyone as assistant chief of defence staff. However, it does show a deputy chief of operations and a deputy chief of plans, neither of which is provided for in the chart which the minister gave us in 1964. The only conclusion one can come to is that the proposed organization has been found unworkable and has been drastically changed. No information with regard to this matter has been given to parliament or to the country. I should like to know what the situation is. This is one of the things the minister should explain before these estimates are passed.

On several occasions in the past I have pointed out that one of the great weaknesses in the proposed changes was the multiplicity of chains of command or lines of communication which this reorganization would produce, with a resulting great waste of time, inability to act quickly and general loss of efficiency. Instead of an operational command having one clear line of communication, as it had in the past and through which it received its orders and instructions, so far as I can make out it now will have ten lines of communication. An example is maritime command. It must have a line of communication to the assistant chief of defence staff and to the chief of plans, if these positions are what now exist, a line of communication to the chief of personnel, one to the chief of logistics, one to the comptroller general and one to each of the other commands, training command, air transport command and so forth. So far as maritime command is concerned, the situation will be even worse in that the R.C.A.F. is a component of it and it will have to have another line of communication dealing solely with R.C.A.F. questions.

It is quite clear that the result of this will be an extremely unwieldy and time-consuming type of organization tailor-made to create confusion, and one which will require more people to make it work than had been the case under the previous organization. In fact my information is that such a state of confusion, uncertainty and disorganization does exist and is one of the things which is contributing powerfully to the lack of morale in the armed forces.

• (12:30 p.m.)

Basic to all of this and the real cause of the existing difficulties is the minister's determination to institute a new system and new programs contrary in many cases to the advice of senior officers. He is attempting really,

to act as the commander in chief of the defence forces and is putting in programs, deciding on equipment, forcing resignations of officers and making promotions, not on the best advice of responsible officers but rather on the basis of his own amateurish theories and prejudices.

I should now like to say something about a few equipment matters. In this regard the minister's lack of knowledge of what was required when he first became minister at least, has been shown quite clearly, I think, by what has happened. I have here a couple of press clippings parts of which I should like to put on record.

The first clipping is from the *Toronto Globe and Mail* of April 14, 1962 and it is an account of a speech the minister made. This is what the minister stated at that time:

The federal government's proposal to purchase three submarines and eight frigates is a "complete and utter waste of \$27,000,000—

Where that \$27 million figure came from I do not know but I assume it is the cost of one frigate. The article continues:

—that won't be able to supply one dollar's worth of protection from Russian atomic submarines," Paul Hellyer said last night.

The second clipping I have is from the *Toronto Globe and Mail* of May 10, 1962, and is an account of a speech made by the minister in Vancouver. He is reported as having said:

What good are destroyer escorts and frigates against a nuclear sub they can't find five miles deep in the ocean.

The minister apparently knew so little about these things that he thought submarines were capable of penetrating five miles deep in the ocean whereas their limit is a few hundred feet. These are statements made by the minister not too long before he became the Minister of National Defence and they indicate his state of knowledge at that time.

In spite of that lack of knowledge the minister plunged ahead into all these new programs. He cancelled the general purpose frigate program which was well under way. Then in the course of time he found that if the navy was to be supplied with ships at all and keep up its strength some program along the same lines was required, so he revived the program. The same ships are being built with exactly the same hulls based on the plans that were produced at the time I was minister. Of course he now gives them a different name, helicopter destroyers or something along that line. He is only going to have four built instead of eight as originally planned.